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Exporting American Discovery 
Yanbai Andrea Wang† 
This Article presents the first comprehensive study of an intriguing and in-
creasingly pervasive practice that is transforming civil litigation worldwide: US 
judges now routinely compel discovery in this country and make it available for dis-
putes and parties not before US courts. In the past decade and a half, federal courts 
have received and granted thousands of such discovery requests for use in foreign 
civil proceedings governed by different procedural rules. I call this global role played 
by US courts the “export” of American discovery. 
This Article compiles and analyzes a dataset of over three thousand foreign 
discovery requests filed between 2005 and 2017 under 28 USC § 1782—an expansive 
statute that is now the pivotal law governing the export of American discovery. I use 
the dataset to show that the foreign civil demand for US discovery has approxi-
mately quadrupled during the study period, that demand from foreign private ac-
tors now overshadows demand from foreign tribunals, and that the requests’ coun-
tries of origin have diversified. I then map the ways in which the machinery of 
domestic discovery is distorted in the context of global discovery, leading to missing 
foreign stakeholders and systematic bias toward compelling discovery. Reflexively 
exporting US discovery, in turn, undermines Supreme Court doctrine, risks impos-
ing unintended externalities on foreign tribunals and foreign litigants, and erodes 
universal notions of fairness and due process. 
Although foreign discovery requests account for a small fraction of federal 
dockets, they provide an illustrative case study of the larger phenomenon of disputes 
straddling multiple legal systems. Litigants and attorneys are now strategizing 
across borders and deploying national procedural tools to their global advantage. 
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Yet, judges continue to operate within national silos even as they play a global role. 
Consequently, judges are at an informational disadvantage when they adjudicate 
disputes only parts of which are before them. This contemporary challenge calls for 
institutional solutions in the form of court-to-court information sharing and coordi-
nation across borders, as well as a reconceptualization of federal judges as global 
actors who share overlapping authority with foreign judges and arbitrators. 
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“A curious quirk of our law is that American courts are not 
limited to American disputes.” 
–Then–Magistrate Judge Paul Singh Grewal, Northern Dis-
trict of California1 
 
“[T]he obvious question is well, why, don’t they have access to 
that discovery vehicle in Argentina, why do they need access to this 
little Reno office[?]” 
–Then–Chief Judge Robert C. Jones, District of Nevada2 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the country, federal courts now routinely have a hand 
in the resolution of foreign civil disputes. They do so by compel-
ling discovery in the United States—typically as much discovery 
as would be available for a lawsuit adjudicated in federal district 
court—and making it available for use in foreign civil proceed-
ings3 governed by different procedural rules. In the past decade 
and a half, federal courts have received and granted thousands of 
such discovery requests.4 They come from foreign courts and for-
eign parties.5 They seek discovery for cases ranging from billion-
dollar environmental controversies6 to the dissolution of 
 
 1 In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, 162 F Supp 3d 1029, 1032 (ND Cal 2016). 
 2 Transcript of Miscellaneous Hearing, Request for International Judicial Assis-
tance from the National Court of First Instance in Labor Matters No 37 of Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, No 3:12-cv-00662, *3 (D Nev filed Apr 13, 2013). 
 3 By foreign civil proceedings, I mean the full range of foreign civil dispute resolu-
tion proceedings for which discovery is now being requested in US federal courts, including 
those before foreign and international courts, foreign regulatory agencies, as well as com-
mercial and investor-state arbitral tribunals. 
 4 See Part II. 
 5 Id. By foreign parties, I mean any parties to foreign civil proceedings. 
 6 See, for example, Memorandum of Law in Support of the Republic of Ecuador and 
Dr. Diego García Carrión’s Application for an Order Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) to Issue a 
Subpoena to John A. Connor for the Taking of a Deposition and the Production of Docu-
ments for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, In re Republic of Ecuador, No 4:11-mc-00516, *2 
(SD Tex filed Nov 28, 2011). 
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marriages,7 and in countries as varied as Chile,8 Romania,9 Iran,10 
and South Korea.11 Since most of these requests are decided in 
low-profile, unpublished orders buried in federal dockets around 
the country, they have received little systematic attention from 
scholars despite their transformative impact on the practice of 
global litigation.12 Nearly every major law firm and numerous 
smaller ones now advise clients and strategize around the avail-
ability of compelled discovery in the United States for use 
abroad.13 Practitioners consider this feature of US law “an 
 
 7 See, for example, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Compel, 
Kwong v Battery Tai-Shing Corp, No C 08-80142, *1–2 (ND Cal filed Feb 5, 2009). 
 8 See, for example, Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Order, Re-
quest for International Judicial Assistance from the 24th Civil Court of Santiago, Chile in 
Juan Carols Said Kattan v Antonio Miguel Orlandini Said, No 1:17-mc-22657, *1 (SD Fla 
filed July 17, 2017). 
 9 See, for example, Order, In re Request for International Judicial Assistance from 
The First Instance Court, Calarasi, Romania; Matter of Ionela Camelia Buzduga v Con-
stantin Viorel Buzduga, No 4:16-mc-01439, *3–4 (SD Tex filed July 4, 2016). 
 10 See, for example, Ex Parte Application, Without a Letter Rogatory Pursuant to 
Title 28 U.S.C § 1782 for Discovery Ordered by Islamic Republic of Iran Kish Island, De-
partment 102, Declaration of Counsel, Declaration of Defendant & Proposed Order, 
Borhani v Ahmadi, No 8:16-mc-00021, *1–2 (CD Cal filed Sept 19, 2016). 
 11 See, for example, Ex Parte Order, In re Letter of Request for International Judicial 
Assistance from the Seoul Central District Court, In the Matter of Subway International 
B.V. v Kyung Hee Hwang, No 1:13-mc-00059, *1 (SDNY filed Feb 22, 2013). 
 12 Scholars writing on the subject have focused almost exclusively on high-profile 
decisions and circuit splits. See notes 38–43 and accompanying text. There is one limited 
systematic study of published decisions granting discovery for use in connection with for-
eign commercial arbitration, but it only examines a small number of unpublished deci-
sions. See Kevin E. Davis, Helen Hershkoff, and Nathan Yaffe, Private Preference, Public 
Process: U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign and International Arbitration *12–14 & nn 75–
77 (NYU School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No 15-51, Oct 30, 2015) 
(identifying twenty-two published opinions of this type). 
 13 See, for example, Duane Loft and Joshua Libling, Discovery in Aid of International 
Proceedings: Recent Developments in Section 1782 (Boies Schiller Flexner, Oct 20, 2015), 
archived at https://perma.cc/QU8U-M9BL; H. Christopher Boehning, Damiën F. Berk-
hout, and Peter Hering, The Consorcio Decision and the Need to Account for Discovery 
Outside the Arbitration Procedure (International Bar Association Legal Practice Division, 
Feb 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/2W24-EXE3; Claudia T. Salomon, David McLean, 
Samuel B.C. de Villiers, and Eric M. Broad, US Court of Appeals Revises Opinion: Sec-
tion 1782’s Use in Arbitration Ambiguous (Latham & Watkins, Feb 3, 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/B5LL-FAL4. 
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invaluable tool,”14 “a powerful strategic advantage,”15 and “a back 
door” for foreign litigants16 that parties ignore “at their peril.”17 
I call this growing global role played by US courts and judges 
the “export” of American discovery.18 In today’s globalized world, 
disputes increasingly cannot be confined to one legal system 
alone. The fact that evidence relevant to a foreign dispute might 
be located in and exported from the United States is a symptom 
and symbol of this modern reality. The export of American discov-
ery provides an illustrative case study of the institutional chal-
lenges that arise when disputes straddle contrasting legal systems. 
For what is being exported is not just information—typically in the 
form of witness testimony or the production of documents—that 
may be submitted as evidence before a foreign tribunal. Along 
with that information comes the compulsory power of US courts 
and a set of procedures and litigation values found virtually no-
where else in the world. 
American civil procedure is well recognized as being excep-
tional.19 Discovery in US federal courts is “far broader” in scope 
than in other countries20 and is primarily conducted and con-
trolled by the parties, rather than by judges.21 Expansive discov-
ery is central to American litigation, and is intertwined with the 
very mission of government in American society—one that is 
more “reactive” and plays a smaller ex post role resolving dis-
putes, rather than a larger ex ante role implementing state 
 
 14 Robert W. Gaffey and Bridget A. Crawford, Developments in U.S. Law Regarding 
a More Liberal Approach to Discovery Requests Made by Foreign Litigants Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1782 (Jones Day, Apr 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/WJL9-Y2CF. 
 15 Lyons Flood, Discovery In Aid of Foreign Proceedings, archived at https:// 
perma.cc/767Z-BFCT. 
 16 Christopher J. Houpt and Mark G. Hanchet, Section 1782 Discovery: A Back Door 
for Foreign Litigants (Mayer Brown, Mar 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/AL66-P94S. 
 17 Harout J. Samra, US Courts Affirm Expansive Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 
(DLA Piper, Sept 29, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/9C6B-PBWF. 
 18 As explained below, “export” here occurs on a case-by-case basis, and with the par-
ticipation of foreign courts or foreign private actors. 
 19 See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3 (Harvard 
2001) (“Compared to other economically advanced democracies, American civic life is more 
deeply pervaded by legal conflict and by controversy about legal processes.”). See also gen-
erally Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American 
Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877 (Yale 2017) (recounting the nineteenth-century or-
igins of the idea of American legal exceptionalism); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American 
Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 Am J Comp L 709 (2005). 
 20 Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v Biomet, Inc, 633 F3d 591, 594 (7th Cir 2011). 
 21 See Part III.A. 
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programs.22 Outside the United States—where litigation may per-
form a different function in regulating society—American discov-
ery is regarded as excessive and has been approached with skep-
ticism and animosity.23 
Operating across different discovery systems offers private 
actors opportunities for arbitrage. Seeking US discovery is typi-
cally straightforward. One files a request with the federal district 
court where the discovery target is located. That request is usu-
ally entertained and granted with minimal judicial activity and 
on an ex parte basis—without the participation of the foreign op-
posing party or the foreign tribunal before which the discovery is 
to be used. The target of the request is then subpoenaed and or-
dered to produce discovery according to the scope and practices of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). The target might 
happen to be the foreign opposing party or might choose to volun-
tarily alert the foreign opposing party, who might in turn inform 
the foreign tribunal, but that does not always happen. The foreign 
opposing party and the foreign tribunal might never know that 
one side of the case was built using different discovery practices 
than those governing the remainder of the dispute. 
These requests generate complications for both the foreign 
opposing party and the foreign tribunal. Take the example of a 
discovery request filed in the Northern District of Alabama by a 
private actor seeking discovery from a US bank for a contem-
plated lawsuit in the British Virgin Islands.24 Such prefiling 
 
 22 See Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative 
Approach to the Legal Process 71–96 (Yale 1986) (describing two orientations of govern-
ment: the “activist” state, which pursues its vision of the good life through policy imple-
mentation and tends toward legal institutions that are hierarchical judicial bureaucracies; 
and the “reactive” state, which provides a framework for its citizens to pursue their own 
goals and tends toward legal institutions that are more like that of the United States). See 
also Kagan, Adversarial Legalism at 3 (cited in note 19) (describing legal process in the 
United States as “adversarial legalism,” meaning “policymaking, policy implementation, 
and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation”); Diego A. Zambrano, 
Discovery as Regulation, 119 Mich L Rev *25–27, 32–34 (forthcoming 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W8DS-7B7D (arguing that American discovery serves regulatory goals by 
relying on private litigants to enforce important statutes). 
 23 See, for example, James H. Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 Intl Law 5, 
5 (1979) (noting that the “virtually boundless sweep of the pre-trial procedures presently 
permitted by many American courts is so completely alien to the procedure in most other 
jurisdictions that an attitude of suspicion and hostility is created”). 
 24 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Bracha Foundation’s Application for an 
Order Granting Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of Bracha Foun-
dation Request for Discovery Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782, No 2:15-mc-00748, *1–2 & n 1 
(ND Ala filed May 1, 2015) (Bracha Foundation Discovery Application Memo). 
2020] Exporting American Discovery 2095 
 
discovery requests are permitted under 28 USC § 178225—an ex-
pansive federal statute written in the 1960s that is now the piv-
otal law governing the export of discovery. The request was ini-
tially granted ex parte and a subpoena was served on the bank, 
which was not a party to the contemplated suit. Months after the 
request was granted and the subpoena served, the anticipated op-
posing party moved to intervene, arguing denial of due process 
because the company was never informed of the request at the 
time the court considered it. In fact, similar discovery requests 
had been made in three additional US district courts without 
alerting the opposing party.26 The Northern District of Alabama 
nevertheless declined to vacate the discovery order.27 This fact 
pattern is common, and there is no effective procedural mecha-
nism for ensuring symmetrical discovery when one side benefits 
from broad US discovery while the other is limited to the more 
restrictive procedures of the foreign tribunal. 
Consider also the example of the European Commission filing 
an amicus brief before the US Supreme Court in 2003 to prevent 
a district court in the Northern District of California from com-
pelling the production of evidence, ostensibly in its aid.28 At the 
time, the European Commission was investigating an antitrust 
complaint brought by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) against its 
worldwide competitor, Intel.29 When the Commission declined 
AMD’s suggestion that it seek certain documents from Intel, AMD 
asked the Northern District of California, the jurisdiction where 
Intel is headquartered, to subpoena Intel for that same infor-
mation.30 The request eventually reached the Supreme Court, 
 
 25 Act of Oct 3, 1964, Pub L No 88-619, 78 Stat 995 (1964), codified at 28 USC § 1782. 
 26 See Bracha Foundation Discovery Application Memo at *1–2 n 1 (cited in note 24) 
(explaining that the private actor commenced a related action in the British Virgin Islands 
and filed similar discovery applications in the United States District Courts for the Southern 
District of New York, the Southern District of Florida, and the Northern District of Ohio). 
 27 See In re Application of Bracha Foundation Request for Discovery Pursuant to 28 
USC § 1782, 2015 WL 6123204, *1 (ND Ala) (explaining that “the use of ex parte § 1782 
applications is widespread and that granting them is not improper based on their ex parte 
nature”). 
 28 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Commission of the European Communities Supporting 
Reversal, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *1–6 (US filed Dec 23, 
2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 23138389) (European Commission Brief). 
 29 European Commission, 37.990 Intel *12–19 (2009), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/9MWQ-XTE8. 
 30 AMD’s Application for Order Directing Intel to Produce Documents Pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Use in European Commission, Case No. Comp/C3-37.990 – 
AMD/Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, No 01-7033, *1–3 (ND Cal filed Oct 
1, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 35995385). 
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where the European Commission argued that granting AMD’s re-
quest in the United States would be a “direct interference” with 
the Commission’s own “orderly process” and would undermine its 
policies, increase its workload, and divert its enforcement re-
sources.31 The Commission protested: “[we do not] want to be used 
as a pawn by . . . private entities seeking to employ [American] 
processes . . . to obtain . . . discovery that’s available under no 
other circumstances.”32 
These two cases illustrate the consequences that American 
discovery can have for foreign courts and foreign parties—conse-
quences that were not intended by Congress or by the Supreme 
Court. When Congress first enacted § 1782 in its current form, it 
believed the statute to be “the kind of assistance that is likely to 
be preferred abroad,”33 and advised federal courts to consider the 
“character” of the foreign proceeding and the “nature and atti-
tudes” of the foreign country and tribunal.34 When the Supreme 
Court took up the dispute between Intel and AMD, it further di-
rected district courts to avoid offense to foreign courts and to main-
tain an appropriate level of parity between foreign litigants.35 
Based on factors set out by the Court,36 the Northern District of 
California denied AMD’s discovery request on remand, given the 
European Commission’s expressed rejection of US discovery.37 
Yet, the export of American discovery has also been described 
as “legal imperialism”38 and “officious intermeddl[ing].”39 And this 
Article’s empirical and doctrinal analyses confirm that federal 
 
 31 Transcript of Oral Argument, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-
572, *18, 21–22 (US filed Apr 20, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 954709). 
 32 Id at *21. 
 33 Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum L 
Rev 1015, 1018 (1965). Hans Smit, professor at Columbia Law School, served as the re-
porter to the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure that drafted the 
current version of § 1782. See id at 1015. 
 34 Judicial Procedures in Litigation with International Aspects, S Rep No 88-1580, 
88th Cong, 2d Sess § 9 at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 USCCAN 3782, 3788. 
 35 See Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, 542 US 241, 261 (2004) (noting that 
comity and parity are “important [ ] touchstones for a district court’s exercise of discretion 
in particular cases”). 
 36 These factors include whether the foreign court needs and is receptive to US discov-
ery, and whether the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering 
restrictions.” Id at 264–65. 
 37 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, 2004 WL 2282320, *1 (ND Cal). 
 38 Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Ju-
dicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational Discovery and Breard Scenarios, 50 
Cath U L Rev 591, 624 (2001). 
 39 Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: 
Toward a New World Order?, 7 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 153, 193 (1999). 
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judges are not able to apply the Supreme Court’s instructions in 
practice. Some pinpoint the problem as § 1782’s conferral of broad 
discretion on federal judges,40 though there is much disagreement 
over how that discretion should be narrowed.41 Others contend 
that the export of American discovery violates the separation of 
powers in the United States,42 and that it is a unilateral fix for a 
set of issues that call for a multilateral solution.43 While a treaty 
governing the international exchange of evidence—the Hague 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention”)—was signed in 
 
 40 See Brian Eric Bomstein and Julie M. Levitt, Comment, Much Ado About 1782: A 
Look at Recent Problems with Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign Litigation 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 429, 431–32 (1989) (explaining that 
the “nearly unbridled discretion” exercised by district courts under 28 USC § 1782 in de-
ciding whether to aid foreign fact-finding “is the root of the problem[ ]”); Marat A. Massen, 
Discovery for Foreign Proceedings After Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Jurisprudence, 83 S Cal L Rev 875, 877 (2010) (noting that most aca-
demic criticism of 28 USC § 1782 and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that statute 
has focused on granting “judges too much discretion for evaluating” foreign discovery re-
quests). 
 41 Proposals include a default rule that requests be denied when they seek discovery 
for certain types of foreign proceedings, most notably commercial arbitrations, and that 
requests be granted only when the sought-after discovery would be discoverable in the 
foreign proceeding in which it is to be used. Courts and academics are split on whether 
§ 1782 permits the export of discovery to commercial arbitral tribunals, and the latter 
proposal was rejected as a bright-line rule by the Supreme Court. Compare In re: Applica-
tion to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F3d 710, 723 (6th Cir 2019) 
(holding that private commercial arbitral tribunals are covered by § 1782); Servotronics, 
Inc v Boeing Co, 954 F3d 209, 214–16 (4th Cir 2020) (same), with Republic of Kazakhstan 
v Biedermann International, 168 F3d 880, 881–83 (5th Cir 1999) (holding that private 
commercial arbitral tribunals are not covered by § 1782); National Broadcasting Com-
pany, Inc v Bear Stearns & Co, 165 F3d 184, 191 (2d Cir 1999) (same). See also, for exam-
ple, New York City Bar Association Committee on International Commercial Disputes, 28 
U.S.C. § 1782 as a Means of Obtaining Discovery in Aid of International Commercial Ar-
bitration—Applicability and Best Practices 19–25 (2008), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
FUP4-K2JD (describing the circuit split). 
 42 See David J. Gerber, Obscured Visions: Policy, Power, and Discretion in Transna-
tional Discovery, 23 Vand J Transnatl L 993, 1007 (1991) (noting that the excessive dis-
cretion exercised by judges in responding to foreign discovery requests inappropriately 
“shifts the available use of United States power from the executive and legislative 
branches to the judiciary”). 
 43 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for In-
ternational Civil Litigation, 57 L & Contemp Probs 103, 135–39 (1994) (criticizing the 
United States’ historical preference for a unilateral approach that is “hard to justify, even 
in purely practical terms, in a world that is increasingly interdependent and in which our 
economic strength is waning”). 
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1970,44 it is widely considered to be ineffective,45 leading some to 
demand further efforts to forge procedural uniformity across na-
tions46 and others to bemoan the futility of seeking convergence 
given the vast procedural differences worldwide.47 Needless to 
say, there is no consensus on whether the export of American dis-
covery is working, and, if not, where the problems lie and what 
an alternative system for sharing evidence would look like. 
I argue that the export of American discovery is in need of 
reform. Its most pressing shortcoming is its failure to include and 
to provide due process to the appropriate actors. When discovery 
is exported, it has ripple effects for foreign adversaries against 
whom the evidence is to be used, and for the foreign tribunal over-
seeing the dispute. Yet, there is no established mechanism for in-
forming or involving those entities. Instead, federal judges have 
remained at arm’s length from the very foreign proceedings they 
are influencing, and have engaged in the impossible task of ab-
stractly weighing foreign interests with no foreign input. The 
problem, therefore, is not an excess of discretion, but a shortage 
of information. This problem can be addressed in the immediate 
term through shifts in judicial practice, and in the medium term 
through changes to the FRCP and amendments to § 1782. In the 
long term, a broader reconceptualization of the global role played 
by federal judges—and the global space in which they operate—
is needed. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the cen-
trality of § 1782 to the export of discovery. The statute allows for-
eign tribunals and foreign private actors to seek US discovery di-
rectly from federal district courts. In interpreting the statute, the 
Supreme Court instructed district courts to consider a foreign tri-
bunal’s need for and receptivity to US discovery, and to maintain 
 
 44 The United States has ratified the Hague Evidence Convention. See Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law, HCCH Members, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
QC9R-7J5Q. 
 45 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 132 (cited in note 43) (noting that the 
Hague Evidence Convention “has been a disappointment to many countries that ratified 
it and a source of controversy and friction”). 
 46 See James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence Convention After 
Aerospatiale, 38 Tex Intl L J 103, 116 (2003) (noting the “need for uniform procedures or 
at least procedural standards” given the Hague Evidence Convention’s failure to bridge 
international differences in discovery procedures). 
 47 See Marcus, 7 Tulane J Intl & Comp L at 199 (cited in note 39) (arguing that 
despite US reforms to constrain discovery in recent decades, “a new world order that fits 
the American reality and also commands the respect of the rest of the industrialized world 
is probably a thing of the remote future so far as discovery is concerned”). 
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an appropriate measure of parity between the parties.48 The stat-
ute’s implementation by lower courts is now fractured along many 
lines, exposing confusion surrounding the statute’s purpose and 
scope, as well as its intended effect on foreign tribunals and the 
parties before them. 
Part II provides a comprehensive, nationwide, descriptive ac-
count of how foreign discovery requests have operated in district 
courts. I compiled a dataset of over three thousand foreign discov-
ery requests filed under § 1782 between 2005 and 2017, approxi-
mately two thousand of which are for use in civil proceedings 
abroad. Relying on the dataset, I show that the foreign civil de-
mand for US discovery has approximately quadrupled in that 
time, and that their countries of origin have diversified. Demand 
from foreign parties now overshadows demand from foreign tri-
bunals, with private actors making more complex and creative 
strategic uses of US procedures across borders. Overall, the grant 
rate is very high (94 percent in 2015) while the contestation rate 
is relatively low (22 percent in 2015), calling into question 
whether US judges are serving as effective discovery gatekeepers 
for disputes in foreign tribunals. 
Part III performs a doctrinal evaluation of the export of Amer-
ican discovery and concludes that US judges are at a severe infor-
mational disadvantage when fielding requests from foreign par-
ties. It is assumed that the machinery of domestic discovery can be 
extended to exported discovery, but the discretion and expertise 
exercised by federal courts in the domestic context cannot be trans-
ferred to discovery requests from foreign parties due to the absence 
of critical actors and the lack of relevant information. Conse-
quently, federal judges have devised shortcuts for the analyses 
they conduct, which in turn place a heavy thumb on the scale for 
granting discovery. Those shortcuts not only undercut congres-
sional intent and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1782, 
but also pose larger normative problems by eroding comity, ad-
verseness, and basic notions of due process and fairness. By con-
trast, the discretion and expertise exercised by federal courts in 
the domestic context is inapposite for discovery requests from for-
eign tribunals, the vast majority of which are governed by treaty. 
Part IV proposes several reforms. I advocate for more active 
judicial management of § 1782 requests that systematically seeks 
out the participation of foreign opposing parties and foreign 
 
 48 See Intel, 542 US at 262–65. 
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tribunals. I also recommend restructuring § 1782 requests so that 
each foreign discovery request is no longer filed as a stand-alone 
US case—a feature that makes these requests uniquely difficult 
to administer. 
Finally, I conclude that this study of § 1782 and its unac-
counted-for foreign impacts suggest broader challenges that 
courts face when disputes straddle multiple legal systems. Liti-
gants and attorneys are adapting to the transnational nature of 
litigation by strategizing across borders and deploying national 
procedural tools to their global advantage. Meanwhile, judges are 
increasingly at an informational disadvantage as they continue 
to operate within national silos, adjudicating disputes, only parts 
of which are before them. These challenges call for institutional 
solutions in the form of court-to-court information sharing and 
coordination across borders, as well as a shift toward reconceptu-
alizing federal judges as global actors who share overlapping au-
thority with foreign judges and arbitrators. 
I.  THE MECHANICS OF EXPORT 
This Part sets out the mechanics, governing laws, and insti-
tutional actors engaged in the export of discovery. The United 
States has been offering some form of exported discovery since the 
mid-nineteenth century. Today, 28 USC § 1782 is the key govern-
ing statute. It provides the broadest and most direct access to US 
discovery, and it is also used internally by the Department of Jus-
tice to execute discovery requests made through two indirect 
routes—the traditional system of letters rogatory and the Hague 
Evidence Convention. This Part describes the three existing 
paths to US discovery, highlights the centrality of § 1782, and ex-
amines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute. 
A. Three Paths to US Discovery 
1. Letters rogatory. 
The traditional “letter rogatory”—a formal request to per-
form a judicial act sent from the court of one country, typically 
through diplomatic channels, to the court of another country49—
is the oldest mechanism for obtaining discovery assistance in the 
 
 49 See Gary B. Born and Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in United 
States Courts 1024 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed 2011). 
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United States.50 It continues to operate today, with the Depart-
ment of State and Department of Justice acting as intermediaries 
for executing them.51 Internationally, letters rogatory are fulfilled 
on a discretionary basis and as a matter of international comity.52 
Domestically, they are accorded the same more favorable treat-
ment as requests made under the Hague Evidence Convention,53 
described below. 
Because letters rogatory originate with a request from a for-
eign court (rather than a party to a foreign suit), the receptivity 
of that court to US discovery assistance is assured. Letters roga-
tory have been criticized for being unwieldy, time-consuming, and 
costly.54 They typically travel from the requesting court in a for-
eign country, to that country’s ministry of foreign affairs, then to 
that country’s embassy in the United States,55 then to the US De-
partment of State, and then to the Office of International Judicial 
Assistance (OIJA) in the Department of Justice. OIJA screens the 
request for straightforward technical requirements, attempts to 
secure the requested discovery voluntarily, and in the absence of 
voluntary compliance, submits the request to a district court,56 
which then relies on § 1782 for execution. Once compelled, the 
discovery travels back to the requesting court via the same path. 
The State Department estimates that this process can take a year 
or more and recommends use of more “[s]treamlined procedures,” 
 
 50 See Act of Mar 2, 1855, ch 140, § 2, 10 Stat 630 (empowering federal courts to 
subpoena witnesses under letters rogatory). 
 51 See 28 USC § 1781(a)(1): 
The Department of State has power, directly, or through suitable channels . . . 
to receive a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international 
tribunal, to transmit it to the tribunal, officer, or agency in the United States to 
whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after execution. 
 52 See 22 CFR § 92.54 (2019) (noting that letters rogatory requests “rest entirely 
upon the comity of courts toward each other, and customarily embody a promise of reci-
procity”); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 Colum L Rev 
2071, 2078 (2015) (defining international comity). 
 53 Telephone Interview with Katerina Ossenova, Office of International Judicial As-
sistance, Department of Justice (Feb 13, 2019) (Ossenova Interview). 
 54 See 22 CFR § 22.1 (2013) (listing $2,275 as the fee for processing a letter rogatory); 
Donald Earl Childress III, Michael D. Ramsey, and Christopher A. Whytock, Transna-
tional Law and Practice 941 (Wolters Kluwer 2015) (explaining that processing is “fre-
quently [ ] delayed by poor diplomatic relations, bureaucratic inertia, and conflicts with 
public policy”). 
 55 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration 1017 (Thom-
son West 3d ed 2006). 
 56 Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53). 
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such as an international treaty or a direct petition to a court, 
when possible.57 
2. 28 USC § 1782. 
During the years following World War II, a surge in interna-
tional business and other cross-border activities led to a “flood of 
litigation” in the United States with international elements.58 
American lawyers, frustrated by procedural differences between 
the United States and the civil law countries of Europe and Latin 
America, called for “a modernization of international legal proce-
dure.”59 With the adoption of the FRCP in 1938, American lawyers 
were accustomed to a liberal, party-driven system of discovery 
aimed at uncovering the “fullest possible knowledge of the issues 
and facts before trial.”60 Yet, in other countries they were forbid-
den from taking evidence directly,61 and had to rely on letters rog-
atory, which they found to be “inefficient, time consuming, and 
costly.”62 Some jurisdictions, like Germany and the Netherlands, 
would not compel the testimony of unwilling witnesses even when 
a letter rogatory was issued.63 And testimony secured through a 
letter rogatory might not be usable in the United States due to 
noncompliance with domestic requirements such as examination 
under oath and oral questioning by an attorney.64 
Congress enacted a number of measures to address these 
challenges. To facilitate the import of discovery, Congress 
 
 57 Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Preparation of Letters Rogatory, 
archived at https://perma.cc/JCE4-Y6V3. 
 58 See Proposed Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Ju-
dicial Procedure, S 1890, 85th Cong, 1st Sess, in 103 Cong Rec S 5726 (Apr 16, 1957) 
(noting that cases with “international ramifications” included “cases in which judicial doc-
uments must be served abroad, records or witnesses examined within the territory of a 
foreign state, or in which proof must be offered of the law prevailing in a foreign jurisdiction”). 
 59 Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Proce-
dure, S Rep No 85-2392, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958 USCCAN 5201, 
5201–02. See also Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 110–11 (cited in note 43). 
 60 Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495, 501 (1947). 
 61 In some countries like Switzerland, it is a criminal infringement of state sover-
eignty for a private party to take evidence. S Rep No 85-2392 at 2 (cited in note 58) (“In 
some jurisdictions, notably Switzerland, there is [a] considerable question whether such a 
procedure might constitute a penal offense on the assumption that it would be regarded 
as an illegal usurpation of judicial functions.”). 
 62 S 1890, 103 Cong Rec at S 5726 (cited in note 58). 
 63 See id. 
 64 See S Rep No 85-2392 at 2 (cited in note 59); Childress, Ramsey, and Whytock, 
Transnational Law and Practice at 940 (cited in note 54); Born and Rutledge, Interna-
tional Civil Litigation at 1025 (cited in note 49).  
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authorized federal courts to subpoena and to hold in contempt an 
American citizen or resident in a foreign country.65 The FRCP 
were revised to specify how testimony could be taken abroad,66 
and permitted district courts to order the production of docu-
ments, regardless of location, so long as they are in the “posses-
sion, custody, or control” of a party to a US proceeding or a non-
party witness over whom the court has jurisdiction.67 
To facilitate the export of discovery, Congress passed 28 USC 
§ 1782 in 194868 and rewrote it in 1964.69 The statute reads: 
The district court of the district in which a person resides or 
is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or 
to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding 
in a foreign or international tribunal. . . . The order may be 
made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, 
by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application 
of any interested person and may direct that the testimony 
or statement be given, or the document or other thing be pro-
duced, before a person appointed by the court. . . . The order 
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in 
whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign coun-
try or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or 
statement or producing the document or other thing. To the 
extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testi-
mony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other 
thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.70 
In 1996, the statute was revised to include discovery for use in crim-
inal investigations71—a subject beyond the scope of this Article. 
At the time of the 1964 revision, the statute was considered 
“a major step in bringing the United States to the forefront of  
nations.”72 It was thought to provide “equitable and efficacious 
 
 65 See Act of June 25, 1948 §§ 1783–84, 62 Stat 869, 949–50, codified at 28 USC 
§§ 1783–84. 
 66 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 112–13 (cited in note 43) (describing 
amendments to Rule 28(b) in 1963). 
 67 FRCP 34, 45. 
 68 The 1948 version authorized district courts to depose “any witness residing within 
the United States [for] use[ ] in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country 
with which the United States is at peace.” Act of June 25, 1948, § 1782, 62 Stat at 949. 
 69 Act of Oct 3, 1964 § 9, 78 Stat at 997. 
 70 28 USC § 1782(a). 
 71 Act of Feb 10, 1996, Pub L No 104-106, 110 Stat 486, 486. 
 72 S Rep No 88-1580 at 2, 13 (cited in note 34). 
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procedures” for foreign tribunals and litigants, and to meet the 
“requirements of foreign practice and procedure.”73 Congress 
hoped that foreign countries would reciprocate by providing US 
litigants with easy access to foreign discovery.74 Despite these 
aspirations, many have observed that foreign countries have not 
in fact reciprocated.75 
3. Hague Evidence Convention. 
While these domestic policies were being put into place, it 
was also recognized that the problems arising from international 
litigation needed an international response. During the late 
1960s, the United States led the negotiations for the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, which was adopted in 1970 and entered into 
force for the United States in 1972.76 It operates through “Letters 
of Request,” which are issued by the judicial authority of one con-
tracting state to the designated “Central Authority” of another, 
and then to the proper domestic authority for execution.77 Within 
the United States, OIJA serves as the Central Authority.78 Once 
a request reaches OIJA, it is carried out in the same way regard-
less of whether it is a request under the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion or a letter rogatory from a non-Convention country.79 OIJA 
screens the request, attempts to secure the evidence voluntarily, 
and then forwards the request to the appropriate federal district 
court for compelled discovery under § 1782.80 Since requests must 
originate from a foreign judicial authority (rather than from a 
party), receptivity of that authority to US discovery is assured. 
The Convention was initially presented to the US Senate and 
to bar associations as requiring other countries to make conces-
sions while not necessitating significant changes domestically 
given the existence of the more powerful § 1782.81 It is now in force 
 
 73 Id at 2, 7. 
 74 Id at 13. 
 75 See, for example, Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 136 (cited in note 43) (la-
menting that § 1782 “reflect[s] the naive view that if the United States were generous, 
other countries would follow its lead”); Lien, 50 Cath U L Rev at 631 (cited in note 38) 
(noting that “the invitation [to follow the US example in liberal export] has been declined”).  
 76 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 23 
UST 2555, 2555–56, TIAS No 7444 (1970) (Hague Evidence Convention). 
 77 Hague Evidence Convention Arts 1–2, 23 UST at 2557–58. 
 78 Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53). 
 79 Except that there are typically no fees associated with a request coming from a 
Hague Evidence Convention state party. Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 132–33 (cited in note 43). 
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between the United States and fifty-four countries.82 Many have 
commented that it has failed to achieve its intended purpose of 
bridging the gap between the United States and civil law coun-
tries.83 All but a handful of contracting states have adopted a dec-
laration that they will not execute letters of request seeking pre-
trial discovery of documents as is common in the United States.84 
Meanwhile, observing that the Convention’s procedures “would 
be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain 
to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules,” 
the Supreme Court concluded in 1987 that the Convention is not 
the exclusive or even the required first resort procedure for Amer-
ican litigants seeking evidence abroad.85 Instead, a US court may 
continue to unilaterally compel extraterritorial discovery from 
those subject to its jurisdiction86—a practice resented by foreign 
countries.87 There remains no effective international agreement 
governing discovery across borders, and some suggest that the 
United States should denounce the Hague Evidence Convention.88 
 
 82 There are sixty-three contracting states overall. The Convention has entered into 
force between the United States and all but three of the other contracting states. See 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Hague Evidence Convention – Ac-
ceptances of Accessions (Apr 21, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/QHB8-SPXE. 
 83 See, for example, Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration at 1052 
(cited in note 55) (noting that the “conflict over the Hague Evidence Convention appears 
as a kind of replay of the overall conflict about American-style litigation, and in particular 
about American-style discovery”). 
 84 See Hague Evidence Convention Art 23, 23 UST at 2568 (“A Contracting State 
may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Let-
ters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as 
known in Common Law countries.”). The Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Ev-
idence Convention explains that Article 23 does not apply to all requests for production of 
documents from common law countries during the pretrial discovery phase, but only to 
those that are not “sufficiently substantiated so as to avoid ‘fishing expeditions.’” See 
Hague Convention on Private International Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of 
the Evidence Convention (3d ed 2016). 
 85 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa, 482 US 522, 542 (1987). 
 86 Aérospatiale left judges to conduct an open-ended, “particularized analysis” to de-
termine whether first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention is required. Id at 543–44. 
See also Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 Stan L Rev 941, 946–47 (2017) (finding 
that this particularized analysis has resulted in federal judges almost never requiring par-
ties to use the Hague Evidence Convention to obtain foreign discovery from other parties). 
 87 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442, Re-
porters’ Note 1 (1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond 
the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the re-
quests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.”). 
 88 See Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S Tex L Rev 
215, 227 (1994) (“While the ruling that the [Hague Evidence] Convention is nonexclusive 
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B. The Centrality of 28 USC § 1782 
These three paths to US discovery now overlap. A foreign tri-
bunal seeking discovery in the United States may either use let-
ters rogatory, the indirect path of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, or the direct path of § 1782. Similarly, a foreign private actor 
may either indirectly ask the relevant foreign tribunal to send a 
request, or directly request it from a federal district court under 
§ 1782, bypassing the foreign tribunal and other intermediary na-
tional authorities. Within the United States, all requests are ul-
timately executed by federal district courts under § 1782.89 Sec-
tion 1782’s statutory language does not differentiate between 
direct requests and indirect requests, or between requests from 
foreign tribunals and those from foreign private actors. 
Direct requests from foreign private actors have caused the 
most complications and are the source of nearly all appeals in the 
past decade.90 Some scholars argue that permitting private actors 
to access US discovery was a “dramatic departure” from the tra-
ditional notion that judicial assistance is provided by one court to 
another.91 In particular, courts have struggled with the question 
of how they should weigh a foreign tribunal’s receptivity to US 
discovery. Section 1782’s statutory language does not shed light 
on this question, but the statute’s legislative history notes that 
federal district courts should consider “the nature and attitudes 
of the government of the country from which the request ema-
nates and the character of the proceedings in that country” when 
granting or denying a § 1782 application.92 
In 2004, the Supreme Court considered whether sought-after 
discovery must be discoverable abroad for it to be discoverable 
under § 1782—a shorthand for determining receptivity that had 
 
is to be welcomed, and a different ruling would have been calamitous, it would neverthe-
less be preferable to denounce the Convention.”). See also Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 Va J Intl L 597, 599 
(1990) (indicating that “litigation regarding discovery in the United States for use abroad 
has turned on the proper interpretation and application of section 1782, not on the inter-
pretation of the Hague Evidence Convention”). 
 89 See 28 USC § 1782. 
 90 See, for example, Kiobel by Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F3d 
238, 240–41 (2d Cir 2018), cert denied, 139 S Ct 852 (2019); Grupo Mexico SAB de CV v 
SAS Asset Recovery, Ltd, 821 F3d 573, 573–75 (5th Cir 2016); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v 
Biomet, Inc, 633 F3d 591, 593–94 (7th Cir 2011); Suzlon Energy Ltd v Microsoft Corp, 671 
F3d 726, 727–28 (9th Cir 2011). 
 91 Born and Rutledge, International Civil Litigation at 1066 (cited in note 49) (asking 
whether it is “wise for § 1782 to provide judicial assistance at the request of foreign litigants”).  
 92 S Rep No 88-1580 at 7 (cited in note 34). 
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been adopted by some courts.93 The Supreme Court rejected the 
foreign discoverability requirement in Intel Corp v Advanced Mi-
cro Devices, Inc,94 a case in which the discovery sought by a pri-
vate actor under § 1782 was not discoverable abroad and ex-
pressly not wanted by the foreign tribunal at issue: the European 
Commission.95 The Commission filed an amicus brief explaining 
that the discovery would give AMD access to documents it is not 
permitted to review under European law, would undermine the 
Commission’s policies on confidential information, and would in-
crease its workload and divert its enforcement resources.96 Sec-
tion 1782, the Commission argued, could “become a threat to for-
eign sovereigns if interpreted expansively.”97 Several industry 
associations filed amicus briefs expressing concern that compel-
ling discovery under § 1782 that is not discoverable abroad could 
produce unfair outcomes when US-style discovery benefits one 
side of a dispute but not the other.98 The Department of Justice 
filed an amicus brief supporting a broad interpretation of § 1782 
since it relies on the statute to execute letters rogatory and letters 
of request under the Hague Evidence Convention.99 
The Supreme Court reasoned that a foreign discovery re-
striction does not necessarily translate into an objection to ex-
ported discovery from the United States.100 Instead, the Court 
enumerated four discretionary factors for district courts to con-
sider: (1) whether the requested evidence is available without 
 
 93 See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F2d 1, 7 (1st Cir 1992); In re Request 
for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F2d 1151, 1156 
(11th Cir 1988). But see Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, 292 F3d 664, 668–69 
(9th Cir 2002) (rejecting a foreign discoverability requirement); In re Bayer AG, 146 F3d 
188, 193–96 (3d Cir 1998) (same); Euromepa S.A. v R. Esmerian, Inc, 51 F3d 1095, 1099–
1100 (2d Cir 1995) (same). 
 94 542 US 241 (2004). 
 95 Id at 250–54. 
 96 See European Commission Brief at *4, 15–16 (cited in note 28). 
 97 Id at *2. 
 98 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae In 
Support of Petitioner, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *1–3 (US filed 
Nov 15, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 23112944); Brief of Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner, Intel Corp v Advanced 
Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *2–3 (US filed Dec 31, 2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 
WL 23112943). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers 
in Support of Petitioner, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *8–11 (US 
filed Nov 15, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 32157392). 
 99 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Intel 
Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *1–2, 11–13 (US filed Jan 30, 2004) (avail-
able on Westlaw at 2004 WL 214306). 
 100 See Intel, 542 US at 261–62. 
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§ 1782; (2) whether the foreign government or court is receptive 
to US federal court judicial assistance; (3) whether the request 
“conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering re-
strictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United 
States”; and (4) whether the request is unduly burdensome or in-
trusive.101 The Supreme Court explained that these factors, as 
well as the exercise of judicial discretion more generally, could 
safeguard comity. Similarly, parity between the foreign adver-
saries could be maintained either by the district court condition-
ing its grant of discovery, or by the foreign tribunal conditioning 
its acceptance of US discovery, on a reciprocal exchange of infor-
mation.102 On remand, the Northern District of California denied 
the discovery request given the European Commission’s amicus 
brief expressing resistance to US discovery.103 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 2004, lower courts’ im-
plementation of § 1782 have continued to fracture along many 
lines. Most prominently, the Courts of Appeals now disagree on 
whether the statute can be used to compel discovery in aid of for-
eign commercial arbitrations. The Seventh Circuit recently held 
that § 1782 does not extend to private international commercial 
arbitrations, placing it in agreement with the Second and Fifth 
Circuits and in conflict with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.104 
Lower courts also disagree on whether § 1782 can be used to com-
pel documents physically located abroad but under the posses-
sion, custody, or control of a US entity.105 Further complicating 
the matter, entrepreneurial litigants now use discovery obtained 
through § 1782 in multiple proceedings before multiple tribunals 
once the statute’s requirements are deemed satisfied with respect 
 
 101 Id at 264–65. 
 102 See id at 262. 
 103 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, 2004 WL 2282320, *2–3 (ND Cal). 
 104 See Servotronics, Inc v Rolls-Royce PLC, No 19-1847, slip op at *15 (7th Cir Sept 
22, 2020); In re Guo, 965 F3d 96, 104–06 (2d Cir 2020); El Paso Corp v La Comision Ejecu-
tiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 F Appx 31, 33–34 (5th Cir 2009); In re Application 
to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F3d 710, 717–730 (6th Cir 2019); 
Servotronics, Inc v Boeing Co, 954 F3d 209, 210 (4th Cir 2020). 
 105 See Sergeeva v Tripleton International Ltd, 834 F3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir 2016) 
(holding that § 1782 reaches “responsive documents and information located outside the 
United States” so long as it is within the “possession, custody, or control of” the discovery 
target); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F3d 520, 524 (2d Cir 2019) (holding that “there is no per 
se bar to the extraterritorial application of § 1782”). But see Pinchuk v Chemstar Products 
LLC, 2014 WL 2990416, *4 (D Del) (quashing a discovery request for documents located 
abroad). 
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to one foreign proceeding.106 These are just a few of the develop-
ments that expose persistent confusion surrounding the statute’s 
purpose and scope, as well as its intended effect on foreign tribu-
nals and the parties before them.107 
II.  EVIDENCE FROM FEDERAL DOCKETS 
This Part presents the findings of the first nationwide study 
of foreign discovery requests in federal district courts. Despite an-
ecdotal reports that foreign discovery requests have experienced 
“a groundswell of popularity,”108 there have been no attempts to 
systematically investigate recent trends in the overall number of 
requests, or their nature, origins, and outcome. I fill this gap by 
compiling and analyzing the most exhaustive existing dataset of 
requests for discovery to be used in civil disputes abroad. 
The number of discovery requests for use in foreign civil pro-
ceedings received by district courts has indeed surged, approxi-
mately quadrupling between 2005 and 2017. Their countries of 
origin have diversified, suggesting that the historical concern 
about procedural differences between the United States and the 
civil law countries within Western Europe and South America 
may not be as central as it used to be. Meanwhile, there is a grow-
ing need to understand legal systems in Asia and Eastern Europe. 
The vast majority of requests fall into two categories: indirect 
requests from foreign courts and direct requests from foreign par-
ties. In other words, foreign parties now have a more direct rela-
tionship with US district courts than do foreign tribunals. More-
over, demand from foreign parties now overshadows demand from 
foreign tribunals in both number and complexity of requests. 
Whereas foreign tribunal requests are fairly straightforward, 
homogenous, and most frequently connected to family law mat-
ters, foreign party requests are more sophisticated, varied, and 
most frequently connected to commercial matters. These diver-
gences suggest that there are different dynamics at play in these 
 
 106 This development has gained traction since the Second Circuit held in 2017 that 
§ 1782 “does not prevent an applicant who lawfully has obtained discovery under the stat-
ute with respect to one foreign proceeding form using the discovery elsewhere unless the 
district court orders otherwise.” In re Accent Delight International Ltd, 869 F3d 121, 135 
(2d Cir 2017). 
 107 See Part III.C. 
 108 Globalization Spurs Use of USC 1782 for U.S. Discovery in Foreign Disputes 
(Bloomberg Law, Feb 17, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/L56T-2TL7. See also Geoffrey 
Kertesz, Section 1782: American Dream . . . or Nightmare?, 22 Trusts & Trustees 293, 297 
(2016) (“If the reported cases are any indication, use of the statute is on the rise.”). 
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two sets of requests. Whether US judges are serving as effective 
discovery gatekeepers in each type of request is examined in the 
next Part. 
Analysis of federal dockets is also illuminating for what it 
cannot reveal. Requests are typically considered ex parte, without 
informing or including the foreign tribunal or foreign opposing 
party, though occasionally notice is given in haphazard ways. For 
reasons explained below, it was not possible to systematically 
track when notification was provided to the foreign tribunal or 
foreign opposing party and therefore when a foreign tribunal was 
aware that a US discovery request had been made. Because I 
could not track foreign tribunal awareness of a US discovery re-
quest being made by a foreign party, it was also not possible to 
determine how often and which foreign courts tended to welcome 
or resist sought-after discovery. Finally, docket analysis provides 
an incomplete picture of when multiple US discovery requests are 
made for the same foreign proceeding, and no information about 
what happens after a request is granted. Federal judges make 
foreign discovery decisions in the absence of this information. 
A. Data Overview 
I compiled a dataset composed of over three thousand discov-
ery requests, filed between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 
2017, seeking compelled discovery under § 1782 for use in foreign 
proceedings. Since § 1782 authorizes discovery requests for for-
eign civil and criminal proceedings, this initial dataset included 
both. Appendix A describes the process I used to build the da-
taset. Briefly, I relied on the Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (PACER) system—a mandatory electronic docketing sys-
tem that provides access to all actions filed in federal district 
courts nationwide.109 I devised a text search for identifying § 1782 
requests that maximized sensitivity without significant sacrifices 
in specificity. I then ran the search on Bloomberg Law, which ren-
ders PACER text searchable. I manually eliminated false posi-
tives and performed several checks to ensure that the dataset is 
 
 109 Other scholars have noted the sampling bias stemming from empirical efforts that 
rely on Westlaw or Lexis searches. These problems are particularly worrisome for studying 
low-profile, routine matters such as § 1782 discovery orders, which tend to be unpublished. 
See, for example, David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of 
Civil Procedure, 65 Stan L Rev 1203, 1214–15 (2013) (discussing incompleteness in 
Westlaw’s and Lexis’s databases); David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, and Jeffrey R. Lidicker, 
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 Wash U L Rev 681, 686 (2007) (same). 
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close to exhaustive and lacking in bias. I selected the time period 
2005 to 2017 to capture recent trends in foreign discovery re-
quests: 2005 is the first full calendar year after the Supreme 
Court decided Intel, and 2017 is the final full calendar year prior 
to commencement of this study. The dataset is summarized year 
by year in Table 5 of Appendix C. I drew a random sample of over 
one thousand discovery requests for more detailed analysis, also 
summarized year by year in Table 5. 
Analysis of the sample shows that approximately one-third 
(919) of all requests were connected to criminal proceedings 
abroad (“criminal requests”), while approximately two-thirds 
(2,070) were connected to civil proceedings abroad (“civil re-
quests”). Breaking down the requests by year shows that the 
number of civil requests has grown rapidly, approximately quad-
rupling between 2005 (49 requests) and 2017 (208 requests). 
While it is not possible to determine from docket analysis the 
causes of this rapid rise, there are several possible reasons for it: 
(1) an increase in cross-border activity leading to more disputes 
abroad for which evidence may be gathered in the United 
States;110 (2) an increase in foreign substantive laws with extra-
territorial reach such that more transnational activity is subject 
to civil suits abroad;111 and (3) an increase in awareness and use 
of § 1782 by law firms, attorneys, and parties. 
There is an inverse trend for criminal requests brought under 
§ 1782,112 though this does not necessarily reflect an overall con-
traction in criminal requests due to the enactment of an overlap-
ping federal statute in 2009.113 There is also a small number of 
cases every year—cumulatively more than one hundred over the 
study period—that are refiled under another case number due to 
 
 110 While different indices for globalization differ on this point, the KOF Globalisation 
Index, which measures globalization along economic, social, and political dimensions, 
shows a moderate increase in globalization for the United States during the years 2005 
through 2016 (the latest year for which data is available). See KOF Swiss Economic Insti-
tute, KOF Globalisation Index, archived at https://perma.cc/6RQL-95VP. 
 111 Thanks to Zach Clopton for this insight. 
 112 See Appendix C, Table 6. 
 113 As noted in Part I, § 1782 was amended in 1996 to encompass discovery requests 
related to criminal investigations. In 2009, Congress enacted 18 USC § 3512, which au-
thorizes federal judges to “issue such orders as may be necessary to execute a request from 
a foreign authority for assistance” with criminal matters. Foreign Evidence Request Effi-
ciency Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-79, 123 Stat 2087 (2009), codified at 18 USC § 3512. 
Correspondence with the Department of Justice confirmed that, since 2009, the agency 
has gradually reduced reliance on § 1782 for executing criminal requests and no longer 
relies on the statute for that purpose. Correspondence with a member of the Department 
of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (Feb 20, 2019) (on file with author). 
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confusion concerning the proper case type designation for foreign 
discovery requests.114 The rising number of civil requests, along 
with upper and lower bounds representing 95 percent confidence 
intervals, are visualized below in Figure 1 and summarized nu-
merically in Table 6 of Appendix C. 
FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS, 2005–2017115 
 
Approximately half of civil requests are sent to the Southern 
District of New York, the Southern and Middle Districts of Flor-
ida, and the Northern and Central Districts of California,116 with 
the rest distributed across the country. Over 60 percent of district 
courts nationwide received at least one foreign civil discovery 
 
 114 See Part III.C.1 (discussing the significance of these refiled cases). 
 115 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population 
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable 
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 116 See Appendix C, Table 7. Concentration of civil requests in these federal district 
courts is not surprising given that American, European, and Asian financial institutions 
have historically been subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, Latin American finan-
cial institutions have traditionally been subject to jurisdiction in Florida, and many tech-
nology companies are subject to jurisdiction in California. Thanks to Kevin Benish for this 
observation. 
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request during the study period.117 The remaining analyses below 
rely on in-depth coding of civil requests from the randomly drawn 
sample. Appendix B describes the methodology I used for coding. 
B. Request Analysis 
I examined basic characteristics of civil requests: who re-
quested them, who they targeted, the nature of the foreign tribu-
nal, the nature of the foreign proceeding for which they were re-
quested, and the country of origin. 
1. Requestor. 
The vast majority of foreign discovery requests come either 
indirectly from foreign tribunals through OIJA (approximately 
40 percent) or directly from foreign parties under § 1782 (approx-
imately 55 percent). For the most part, foreign tribunals continue 
to seek judicial assistance indirectly through the Hague Evidence 
Convention and letters rogatory despite having direct access to 
federal courts.118 Additionally, a tiny number of requests originate 
from a broader class of “interested persons” (approximately 
0.77 percent) who are not a party to, but have some procedural 
rights in, a foreign proceeding.119 These findings are summarized 
in Table 8 of Appendix C. Figure 2 below visualizes the increase 
in tribunal and party requests over time, and shows that the num-
ber of party requests has exceeded the number of tribunal re-
quests in most recent years. 
 
 117 Fifty-eight of the ninety-four district courts in the federal system received at least 
one civil request, while thirty-six district courts did not receive any. 
 118 In a tiny number of actions, requests originating from tribunals are filed directly 
with a district court (approximately 1.1 percent) or are conveyed to the district court by a 
foreign party (approximately 2.8 percent). 
 119 The Supreme Court interpreted “interested person[s]” from the statutory language 
of § 1782 to “reach[ ] beyond the universe of persons designated ‘litigant.’” Intel, 542 US 
at 256. 
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FIGURE 2: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS FROM 
FOREIGN TRIBUNALS AND FOREIGN PARTIES, 2005–2017120 
 
2. Target. 
The vast majority of civil requests seek discovery from non-
parties to the proceeding abroad. This is true for requests from 
foreign tribunals (approximately 85 percent) and foreign parties 
(approximately 88 percent), and remains consistent over the 
study period. Nonparty targets include banks, Internet and social 
media companies, as well as law firms. The prominence of non-
parties as targets is in part because nonparties located in the 
United States cannot be reached by the foreign court where the 
case is pending, and in part because discovery targeting nonpar-
ties is favored under Intel, so it is advantageous to target a US 
nonparty even if a foreign party holds the same information.121 
 
 120 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population 
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable 
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 121 See Part III for discussion. 
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Table 9 of Appendix C provides a breakdown of requests from for-
eign tribunals and foreign parties by target. 
3. Nature of foreign tribunal and proceeding. 
Overall, requests from foreign tribunals are more homogene-
ous than those from foreign parties. Virtually all requests from 
foreign tribunals seek discovery for use in one pending litigation 
before a foreign court. Requests from foreign parties are more var-
ied. The vast majority are for use before foreign courts (approxi-
mately 90 percent), but a steady number are for use in commer-
cial arbitrations (approximately 9.9 percent) and a smaller 
number are for use before foreign regulatory agencies (approxi-
mately 4 percent) and investor state arbitrations (approximately 
2.5 percent).122 Most party requests are for use in one foreign pro-
ceeding (approximately 72 percent) or in only pending foreign 
proceedings (approximately 84 percent). But nearly a third are for 
simultaneous use in multiple proceedings worldwide (approxi-
mately 28 percent) and a steady number are for use in contem-
plated foreign proceedings that are yet to be filed (approximately 
15.9 percent). Tables 10 and 11 of Appendix C summarize these 
findings. The number of foreign party requests seeking discovery 
for contemplated prefiling proceedings—as well as those for mul-
tiple parallel proceedings worldwide—are increasing over time.123 
There is significant breadth in the substantive merits issues 
in dispute in the foreign civil proceedings. Requests from foreign 
tribunals are concentrated primarily in family law (approxi-
mately 52 percent), followed by contract (approximately 15 per-
cent) and employment law (approximately 12 percent). These 
substantive areas have remained consistently prevalent for tribu-
nal requests over the study period.124 Requests from foreign par-
ties are concentrated primarily in contract law (approximately 
27 percent), followed by intellectual property and trade secret law 
(approximately 19 percent), and corporate law (approximately 
12 percent). While the prevalence of contract law disputes in for-
eign party requests has remained consistent over the study pe-
riod, the number of intellectual property and corporate law dis-
putes has grown over time and the number of family law disputes 
 
 122 Requests that sought discovery for use in multiple forums were counted toward 
each category, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. I double 
counted because each forum is independently significant. 
 123 Year-by-year data are on file with author. 
 124 See Appendix B for a full list of the substantive area categories. 
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has diminished.125 These shifting tides suggest that the private 
usage of § 1782 is increasingly driven by corporations and in-
creasingly involves the types of cases that are likely to result in 
voluminous discovery requests.126 Table 12 of Appendix C sum-
marizes these findings. 
4. Country of foreign proceeding. 
As the number of civil requests has increased over the years, 
so too has the diversity of countries from which they originate.127 
This is true both for all requests taken together and for tribunal 
and party requests taken separately. 
Breaking down the countries by region, legal system type, 
and Hague Evidence Convention status128 further illustrates the 
range of countries with which district courts are interacting. The 
majority of tribunal requests come from the Americas (approxi-
mately 62 percent), and the most significant region of growth dur-
ing the study period is Eastern Europe. The majority of party re-
quests come from Western Europe (approximately 61 percent), 
and the most significant region of growth for party requests is 
Asia.129 Tribunal requests predominantly seek discovery for use 
in civil law countries (approximately 93 percent) and in countries 
for which the Hague Evidence Convention is in force with respect 
to the United States (approximately 86 percent). Party requests 
are again more varied. About as many come from common law 
countries (approximately 44 percent) as civil law countries (ap-
proximately 46 percent), and a steady number comes from mixed 
or other legal systems (approximately 17 percent).130 Most party 
requests come from countries for which the Hague Evidence Con-
vention is in force with respect to the United States (approxi-
mately 62 percent), but a significant number also come from other 
 
 125 Year-by-year data are on file with author. 
 126 Born and Rutledge, International Civil Litigation at 967–68 (cited in note 49) (not-
ing that substantive claims involving antitrust, patent, product liability, and other similar 
cases often result in “sweeping” discovery requests compared to routine contract or tort 
disputes). 
 127 See Appendix C, Figure 4 showing and explaining a graph visualizing a rise in 
Shannon’s entropy, calculated on the mixture of countries over the study period. 
 128 See Appendix B for a full list of each of these categories. 
 129 Year-by-year data are on file with author. 
 130 Requests that sought discovery for use in multiple countries with different legal 
system types were counted toward each category, which is why the percentages add up to 
more than 100 percent. I double counted because each legal system type is independently 
significant. 
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countries (approximately 43 percent).131 See Tables 1 and 2 below 
summarizing these findings. 
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY REGION OF 
ORIGIN, 2005–2017132 
 












































































 131 Requests that sought discovery for use in multiple countries with different Hague 
Evidence Convention statuses were counted toward each category, which is why the per-
centages add up to more than 100 percent. I double counted because each Convention sta-
tus is independently significant. 
 132 Where a request sought discovery for use in countries in multiple regions, it was 
counted toward each region, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 per-
cent. To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric dis-
tribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) tri-
bunal requests in the overall population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a 
second time to estimate how many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals. 
I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal re-
quests to calculate the lower bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This 
method errs on the side of wider confidence intervals. 
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY LEGAL 
SYSTEM ATTRIBUTE133 
 

























































Breaking down the countries by rule-of-law rating,136 which 
was examined for the three-year period 2015–2017 due to limita-
tions in the rule-of-law data used,137 more party requests are for 
use in countries with relatively high rule-of-law scores than are 
tribunal requests. Approximately half (57 percent) of party 
 
 133 Where a request sought discovery for use in countries that fell into multiple cate-
gories of any attribute, it was counted toward each category, which is why the percentages 
sometimes add up to more than 100 percent. To calculate the 95 percent confidence inter-
vals, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence in-
terval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall population. I then 
used the hypergeometric distribution a second time to estimate how many requests of this 
particular sort were made by tribunals. I took a conservative approach and used the lower 
bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of 
requests made by tribunals, etc. This method errs on the side of wider confidence intervals. 
 134 For a list of countries with each legal system type, see Appendix B. 
 135 For a list of countries with each Hague Evidence Convention status, see id. 
 136 As noted in Appendix B, I employed the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. 
Like other rule-of-law indexes, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Freedom 
House’s Freedom in the World Index, and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has been criticized for conceptual 
and methodological problems. Without overlooking or discounting these problems, I use 
the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index as an imperfect way to generate a rough 
picture of the types of legal systems with which federal district courts are interacting in 
foreign discovery requests, and whether that picture is different for foreign tribunal versus 
foreign party requests. 
 137 See Appendix B (discussing rule-of-law score categories and data). 
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requests came from countries with rule-of-law scores in the top 
quartile compared to a third (33 percent) of tribunal requests. At 
the other end of the spectrum, approximately one-tenth (9.4 per-
cent) of party requests came from countries with rule-of-law 
scores in the bottom quartile compared to approximately a quar-
ter (24 percent) of tribunal requests. Note that a far greater pro-
portion of party than tribunal requests (approximately 22 percent 
versus 0.95 percent) came from countries for which no rule-of-law 
rating is available, suggesting that more party requests are com-
ing from countries that have not traditionally received as much 
attention in the US legal community. Table 3 below summarizes 
these findings. 
These findings suggest that US courts are now interacting 
with a larger spectrum of legal systems worldwide, as opposed to 
the relatively narrow focus on the civil law systems within West-
ern Europe and South America when the Hague Evidence Con-
vention was negotiated during the 1960s.138 Since most legal 
scholarship on comparative law concentrates on these regions, it 
is unclear how conclusions from that literature extend to the rest 
of the world. There is a growing need to understand a more di-
verse set of legal systems worldwide, and the types of discovery 
to which they may be open. 
 
 138 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 132 (cited in note 43) (explaining that the Con-
vention was “[i]ntended . . . to bridge gaps between the civil law and common law systems”). 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY RULE-OF-
LAW SCORE139 
 























































C. Outcome Analysis 
Finally, I examined the outcome of requests. I used two crude 
proxies to gauge the complexity of requests: the number of docket 
entries and the number of orders.140 I also tracked whether the 
request was ultimately granted.141 
Foreign party requests are more complex and require more 
judicial activity to resolve than those from foreign tribunals. But 
both sets of requests are resolved relatively quickly and with min-
imal judicial activity. Requests from foreign tribunals are typi-
cally resolved with one order—the order granting or denying the 
request—and such requests were granted approximately 
98.1 percent of the time.142 Requests from foreign parties typically 
 
 139 Where a request sought discovery for use in countries that fell into multiple cate-
gories of any attribute, it was counted toward each category, which is why the percentages 
sometimes add up to more than 100 percent. To calculate the 95 percent confidence inter-
vals, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence in-
terval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall population. I then 
used the hypergeometric distribution a second time to estimate how many requests of this 
particular sort were made by tribunals. I took a conservative approach and used the lower 
bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of 
requests made by tribunals, etc. This method errs on the side of wider confidence intervals. 
 140 See Appendix B. 
 141 See id. 
 142 This grant rate is calculated by taking the number of cases over the sum of the 
number of cases granted and the number of cases denied. Cases that did not reach resolu-
tion are not included in the denominator. See Appendix C, Tables 14 and 15. 
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take about three orders to resolve, and were granted approxi-
mately 86.6 percent of the time.143 The overall grant rate for all 
requests over the study period was approximately 91.9 percent.144 
Excluded from these grant rate calculations are requests that did 
not reach resolution, often because the foreign proceeding had 
settled or otherwise reached a conclusion before the US discovery 
request reached completion, which in turn led the applicant to 
withdraw the request. Requests with no resolution outnumber de-
nials in both tribunal and party requests, suggesting that the lack 
of timing coordination between the US discovery request and the 
foreign plenary proceeding limits the potential use of US discov-
ery abroad.145 Figure 3 below visualizes the estimated grant rate 
for all requests, tribunal requests, and party requests over the 
study period. Tables 13, 14, and 15 in Appendix C summarize the 
numerical outcome data. 
While it would be illuminating, it is not possible to compare 
these grant rates to those of domestic discovery requests. This is 
first and foremost because domestic discovery is typically negoti-
ated between the parties at the outset and does not generate a 
record in the docket unless there is a disagreement and a motion 
to the court to resolve it. Additionally, I have not found any em-
pirical research quantifying the rate at which motions to compel 
or motions for protective orders are granted domestically. 
 
 143 See id. 
 144 See Appendix C, Table 15. 
 145 See Appendix C, Table 14. 
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FIGURE 3: ESTIMATED GRANT RATES OF CIVIL REQUESTS 
For 2015 only, I tracked the outcome and contestation sta-
tus—meaning whether the request was challenged146—for every 
request. Table 4 below summarizes the findings. Tribunal re-
quests were granted 98.9 percent of the time and contested only 
3.3 percent of the time. Party requests were granted 90 percent of 
the time and contested 37 percent of the time. The grant rate was 
higher for uncontested party requests (93.9 percent) than con-
tested party requests (82.4 percent). The overall grant rate for 
both sets of requests was 94 percent and the overall contestation 
rate was 22 percent. 
 
 146 A request may be challenged at the outset if notice was provided. More likely, a 
request was initially granted ex parte and then subsequently challenged in the form of a 
motion to quash, motion to vacate, motion to stay, motion for reconsideration, or a motion 
to compel from the requestor that is opposed. A request may be challenged by the target 
of discovery, whether party or nonparty to the foreign proceeding, or it may be challenged 
by the nontarget opposing party. I did not count entries of stipulated protective orders or 
other requests for confidentiality agreements as contestation. See Appendix B. 
2020] Exporting American Discovery 2123 
 
TABLE 4: GRANT AND CONTESTATION RATES FOR 2015147 
 
 Requests from  
Foreign Tribunals 





98.9% 90% 94% 
Contestation 
Rate149 
3.3% 37% 22% 
Grant Rate for  
Contested 
67%150 82.4% 81.1% 
Grant Rate for  
Uncontested 
100% 93.9% 97.3% 
 
Logistic regression consistently indicated a strong negative 
correlation between a request being contested and its likelihood 
of being granted.151 This correlation was strongly indicated even 
in the presence of other variables significantly correlated with 
 
 147 These figures are not estimates, as they are based on all requests in 2015. 
 148 The grant rate is calculated by taking the number of granted requests over the 
sum of the number of granted requests and denied requests. Requests that did not reach 
resolution are not included in the denominator. 
 149 The contestation rate is calculated by taking the number of challenged requests 
over the sum of the number of challenged requests and unchallenged requests (including 
requests involving a stipulated protective order or other confidentiality agreement). 
 150 There were only three contested tribunal requests and one was denied. 
 151 To identify the best logistic regression model, I followed a standard best-subset 
approach: for each model size, I fitted a model with every possible combination of variables 
and chose the model with the lowest residual deviance. To select the appropriate model 
size and to avoid overfitting, I then performed cross-validation and considered two metrics 
that penalize large models, AIC and BIC. BIC and cross-validation both pointed toward a 
one-variable model containing only contestation, whereas AIC pointed toward a three-
variable model containing contestation, target identity, and numerosity of foreign pro-
ceedings for which discovery was requested. I additionally performed Firth logistic regres-
sion, a penalized form of regression designed to address the problems associated with sep-
arated or nearly separated data. See Georg Heinze, A Comparative Investigation of 
Methods for Logistic Regression with Separated or Nearly Separated Data, 25 Statist Med 
4216, 4224–25 (2006). The Firth regression suggested a three-variable model containing 
contestation, target identity, and the legal system type of the country from which the re-
quest originated. 
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contestation.152 With respect to the remaining variables, logistic 
regression yielded inconsistent results.153 
D. Unknowns 
While docket analysis can shed light on the nature of foreign 
discovery requests and their outcomes in federal district courts, 
there are several critical pieces of information that docket analy-
sis cannot reveal. First, it cannot show whether the foreign op-
posing party was notified about discovery requests coming from 
foreign parties. Requests are typically considered ex parte at the 
outset.154 If an ex parte request is granted, as most are, a sub-
poena and order are served on the discovery target, which is when 
the target learns of the discovery request. If the target is, or is 
related to, the foreign opposing party (itself difficult to ascertain 
in a systematic manner), then the latter learns of the request at 
the same time. If the target is not related to the foreign opposing 
party, notification cannot be systematically tracked because, as 
discussed in Part III, it is provided haphazardly and sometimes 
in the absence of a written record.155 Without knowing when noti-
fication was provided, I was unable to examine the extent to 
which the low contestation rate was due to lack of notice versus 
failure to contest. If the lack of notice is depressing the contesta-
tion rate, then it may also be raising the grant rate. 
Second, for similar reasons, and also discussed in Part III, it 
was not possible to systematically track whether the foreign tri-
bunal received notification of the request. Without this infor-
mation, I was unable to differentiate lack of awareness that the 
discovery request had been made from lack of resistance to US 
discovery. Consequently, it was not possible to look for any 
 
 152 In the one-variable model containing contestation, the absence of contestation was 
associated with a 2.17 increase in the log-odds of a request being granted, significant at 
the level of p = 0.001. In the Firth three-variable model, contestation was associated with 
a 1.72 increase in the log-odds of a request being granted, significant at the level of 
p = 0.015. 
 153 Given the problematic nature of the 2015 data set, however, this should not be 
taken as evidence against an association between these variables and the likelihood of a 
request being granted. The 2015 data set had a strikingly high grant rate (over 94 per-
cent), perfect separation along one variable, and near perfect separation along another. 
Several covariates strongly correlated with each other as well. 
 154 See Part III.C.1. 
 155 For example, notice might be given informally as a matter of courtesy or inci-
dentally through communication between the target and the foreign opposing party. Id.  
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overarching patterns in the types of foreign tribunals that are 
more receptive or opposed to US discovery. 
Third, docket analysis provides incomplete information about 
when multiple discovery requests are made in the United States 
for the same foreign proceeding. Unlike domestic discovery re-
quests that are a part of a larger plenary dispute and overseen by 
the same judge, each foreign discovery request is its own stand-
alone action. Consequently, a single proceeding abroad can gen-
erate many discovery requests in different US district courts, 
each before a different judge. Sometimes, these requests are con-
solidated and other times they are not. 
Finally, docket analysis does not provide systematic infor-
mation about what happens after discovery is compelled—includ-
ing whether the requested discovery was ultimately produced and 
submitted to the foreign tribunal, whether the foreign tribunal 
took it under consideration, and whether it affected the outcome 
of the foreign proceeding. In Intel, the Supreme Court asserted 
that district and foreign courts could, respectively, condition 
grants and acceptances of discovery on reciprocal exchanges of in-
formation between the foreign parties to maintain an appropriate 
measure of parity.156 District courts very rarely impose such a con-
dition,157 and it is not possible to know from docket analysis if such 
a condition is imposed downstream by the foreign tribunal. In 
short, the impact of discovery compelled in the United States on 
foreign proceedings and foreign parties is largely unknown—to 
scholars relying on docket analysis as well as to US judges decid-
ing foreign discovery requests, and, in most cases, granting 
them.158 
III.  EVALUATING AMERICAN DISCOVERY IN THE WORLD 
Having characterized the rise in foreign demand for US dis-
covery, the differences between demand from foreign tribunals 
and foreign parties, the high rates at which both types of requests 
are granted, and the key unknowns, this Part now evaluates doc-
trinally whether US judges are serving as effective discovery 
gatekeepers for foreign proceedings. All foreign discovery 
 
 156 See Intel, 542 US at 262. 
 157 Although I did not systematically track whether granted discovery requests were 
conditioned on a reciprocal flow of information, reciprocity is extremely rare. A few exam-
ples are discussed below in Part III.C.3. 
 158 To find this information, one would have to interview those to whom compelled US 
discovery was granted and track down each foreign proceeding abroad. 
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requests for use in civil disputes abroad are executed under 
§ 1782, regardless of whether they began as a letters rogatory, a 
request under the Hague Evidence Convention, or a § 1782 appli-
cation brought directly by a foreign party.159 Section 1782, in turn, 
has been described as a “screen” or “threshold determination” of 
whether to allow a foreign actor access to US discovery as it oper-
ates domestically.160 Once that threshold is overcome, § 1782 
“drops out” and the “ordinary tools of discovery management” un-
der the FRCP take over.161 It is assumed that the FRCP can be 
seamlessly translated from the domestic to the transnational con-
text, and that district courts can weigh the interests of affected 
parties in foreign countries just as they do in the United States. 
Drawing from the empirical findings above as well as district 
court proceedings and appellate court decisions, I argue that the 
machinery developed for domestic discovery is both improperly 
applied to—and ill-equipped to manage the challenges of—ex-
ported discovery. The blueprint for domestic discovery falls short 
in distinctive ways when applied to requests from foreign tribu-
nals. In entertaining requests from foreign tribunals, federal 
courts have a greatly reduced justification for exercising the dis-
cretion they typically wield under the FRCP or under Intel’s dis-
cretionary factors. That is because tribunal requests are not ad-
versarial, and there is no uncertainty surrounding whether the 
foreign tribunal is receptive to US discovery, given that the tribu-
nal is making the request. 
By contrast, requests from foreign parties are—and should 
be—adversarial between the two contending parties in the for-
eign dispute. But much of the time they are not, or they involve 
some but not all of the relevant stakeholders, resulting in a dis-
torted adversarialism and missing information. I identify who the 
relevant stakeholders are and the information that each uniquely 
possesses, in the absence of which district courts are unable to 
undertake the analysis required under the FRCP or under Intel’s 
discretionary factors. Because judges are at a severe informa-
tional disadvantage when fielding requests from foreign parties, 
 
 159 See Part I.B. 
 160 See, for example, Texas Keystone, Inc v Prime Natural Resources, Inc, 694 F3d 548, 
554 (5th Cir 2012); Government of Ghana v ProEnergy Services, LLC, 677 F3d 340, 343 
(8th Cir 2012); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v Biomet, Inc, 633 F3d 591, 597 (7th Cir 2011). 
 161 Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F3d at 597. See also 28 USC § 1782 (“To the extent that the 
order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the docu-
ment or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
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they have developed more manageable heuristics that place a 
heavy thumb on the scale for granting applications, which in turn 
threatens to undermine foreign litigation as well as universal and 
American litigation values. 
Part III.A examines the underlying tenets of domestic discov-
ery. Parts III.B and III.C look, respectively, at how foreign tribunal 
requests and foreign party requests deviate from this framework. 
A. A Domestic Procedure for Foreign Use 
At the core of American civil litigation is a litigant-driven sys-
tem for obtaining information from adverse parties that aims to 
give both sides “the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and 
facts before trial.”162 That system is considered fundamental to 
fair adjudication because it narrows the issues, promotes settle-
ment, and reduces surprises during trial.163 It relies on contending 
adversaries to negotiate a mutual exchange of information that 
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case, and a 
judge to manage and resolve discovery disagreements. Although 
this vision of active judicial management of discovery has not 
been fully realized in the domestic context,164 setting out this ideal 
highlights the grave problems posed by discovery in the interna-
tional context. 
The FRCP give litigants broad authority to obtain from each 
other “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is rele-
vant to any party’s claim or defense.”165 This scope is subject to 
the requirement that discovery be “proportional to the needs of 
the case,” which requires a consideration of “the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the par-
ties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ re-
sources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, 
and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
 
 162 Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495, 501 (1947). 
 163 See United States v Procter & Gamble Co, 356 US 677, 682 (1958) (“Modern in-
struments of discovery . . . make a trial less a game of blindman’s buff and more a fair 
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”); Hick-
man, 329 US at 507 (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties 
is essential to proper litigation.”); John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need 
for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 Duke L J 547, 556–63 (2010). 
 164 See Paul W. Grimm and David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Re-
form: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 SC L Rev 495, 
505–07 (2013) (noting “a lack of active judicial management” despite general agreement 
that active judicial involvement in discovery “leads to better . . . results”). 
 165 FRCP 26(b)(1). 
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outweighs its likely benefit.”166 The adversaries direct discovery 
requests to each other and negotiate the level of compliance.167 If 
they are unable to reach an agreement, a litigant can ask the court 
to compel discovery or for a protective order to forestall discovery.168 
The current regime is the result of changes made over the 
past few decades in response to criticisms that discovery has been 
used abusively.169 The ongoing debate on the need for discovery 
reform in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article,170 
except to note the measures courts have adopted to address dis-
covery abuse. Most notably, the Supreme Court has reinterpreted 
the FRCP’s pleading standard, raising the bar for surviving a mo-
tion to dismiss as an indirect way to narrow discovery.171 The 
FRCP have also been revised to encourage “more aggressive judi-
cial control and supervision,”172 both at the outset through pretrial 
scheduling conferences, and later on through the proportionality 
requirement. The adversaries and the court “have a collective re-
sponsibility to consider [ ] proportionality.”173 Participation from 
all parties is needed to elucidate the proportionality factors since 
each party holds different information, and that information may 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and 
Proposals for Change, 31 Vand L Rev 1295, 1304 (1978): 
Modern discovery [ ] has removed most of the decisive plays from the scrutiny of 
the court. Because so many civil cases are settled before trial and because the 
conduct of attorneys is subject only to fitful and superficial judicial review during 
the discovery stage, much of the decisive gamesmanship of modern litigation 
takes place in private settings. 
 168 See FRCP 26(c)(1) (providing that a party “from whom discovery is sought” can 
move for a protective order following an effort to resolve the dispute without court action; 
protective order can be issued to protect from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense”); FRCP 37 (providing that a party may move for an order to 
compel discovery following an effort to obtain the discovery without court action). 
 169 See FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1980 Amendment, Note 
to Subdivision (f) (“There has been widespread criticism of abuse of discovery.”); FRCP 26, 
Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1983 Amendment (“Excessive discovery and 
evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems.”). See 
also Herbert v Lando, 441 US 153, 179 (1979) (Powell concurring) (expressing concern that 
federal discovery rules are “not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice”). 
 170 See, for example, Matthew T. Ciulla, Note, A Disproportionate Response? The 2015 
Proportionality Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), 92 Notre Dame L 
Rev 1395, 1405–09 (2017) (noting wide differences in opinion concerning the need for dis-
covery reform). 
 171 See Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 558–60 (2007) (discussing the cost 
of discovery); Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 684–86 (2009) (same). 
 172 FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1983 Amendment, Note to 
Subdivision (g). 
 173 FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—2015 Amendment. 
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change or clarify over time.174 When parties disagree, the court’s 
role is to consider all the factors given the information provided 
by the parties, and to arrive at a case-specific determination, 
which is in turn reviewed for abuse of discretion.175 Some scholars 
have questioned whether judges can effectively apply the propor-
tionality requirement, given the vagueness of the standard and 
judges’ relative lack of in-depth knowledge about the facts of the 
case.176 Some of the proportionality factors are difficult to quantify 
or require forecasting the value of sought-after information to the 
underlying dispute.177 
The FRCP also allow parties to seek compelled discovery from 
nonparties178—a process that maintains the core adversarial rela-
tionship between the parties by involving all parties to the dis-
pute as well as the court presiding over the action. Notice and a 
copy of the subpoena must be served on each party to the dispute 
before it can be served on the nonparty target,179 so that other 
parties have an opportunity to object, to monitor the discovery, 
and to seek access to the information produced or make additional 
discovery requests of their own.180 When the nonparty is not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in the district where the case is pending, 
two district courts may be involved. The district court where the 
case is pending issues the subpoena,181 and the district court where 
the nonparty is found manages compliance and hears subpoena-
related motions182—a measure designed to protect nonparties 
through local resolution of disagreements. The judge in the 
 
 174 See id (noting that the factors may not be fully understood at the outset and that 
the requesting party may not know about the burden or expense, while the requested party 
may not know about the importance of the sought-after discovery for resolving the under-
lying issues). 
 175 See, for example, Moore v Ford Motor Co, 755 F3d 802, 808 (5th Cir 2014) (explain-
ing that a judge’s discovery decision is reversible only if it is “arbitrary or clearly unrea-
sonable” and results in “prejudice”). 
 176 See, for example, Ciulla, Note, 92 Notre Dame L Rev at 1402 (cited in note 170) 
(noting that the impact of amendments has not been as great as expected); Scott A. Moss, 
Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving 
Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 Duke L J 889, 889–90 (2009) (noting that the “pro-
portionality rules are impossible to apply effectively”). 
 177 See Jonah B. Gelbach and Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Pro-
portionality in Discovery, 50 Ga L Rev 1093, 1114–16 (2016). 
 178 See FRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(iii) (stipulating that a subpoena may compel a person to “at-
tend and testify; produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tan-
gible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control”). 
 179 See FRCP 30(b)(1), 45(a)(4). 
 180 See FRCP 45(a)(4), (b) (setting out service requirements). 
 181 See FRCP 45(a)(2). 
 182 See FRCP 45(a)(1)–(2). 
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compliance court is encouraged to consult with the judge in the 
issuing court on subpoena-related motions, since the latter is 
more familiar with the underlying case.183 Motions can also be 
transferred back to the issuing court so as not to disrupt the issu-
ing court’s supervision over the underlying litigation, as might 
occur if the same discovery questions are likely to arise in many 
district courts or if the issuing court has already ruled on ques-
tions implicated by the motion.184 The FRCP recognize that the 
participation of the judge presiding over the case may be neces-
sary due to her knowledge of the case and in order to consistently 
manage discovery requests across the case. 
B. Use by Foreign Tribunals 
When a district court receives a discovery request from a for-
eign tribunal, its role bears little resemblance to discovery within 
the United States. Under long-standing custom, these requests 
are typically considered on an ex parte basis.185 This practice is 
characterized by Professor Jim Pfander and Daniel Birk as an ex-
ercise of “non-contentious” Article III jurisdiction, which gives 
federal courts power to consider nonadversarial applications as-
serting a legal interest under federal law.186 While the target of a 
foreign tribunal request may oppose the discovery sought, leading 
to litigation that creates “a measure of adverseness,”187 tribunal 
requests are not adverse between the two contending parties in 
the underlying plenary dispute. For this reason, discovery re-
quests from foreign tribunals have been likened to administrative 
 
 183 See FRCP 45, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—2013 Amendment, Note 
to Subdivision (f). 
 184 See id. 
 185 See In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F2d 1216, 1219 
(9th Cir 1976) (“Letters Rogatory are customarily received and appropriate action taken 
with respect thereto ex parte.”). 
 186 James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L J 1346, 1355, 1390–91 (2015). 
 187 Id at 1391. 
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subpoenas that federal courts enforce on behalf of agencies188—a 
limited judicial role that has been described as “adjunct.”189 
Without adversity between the two contending parties to the 
foreign dispute, district courts cannot exercise their usual broad 
discretion in evaluating domestic discovery disputes. There are 
no party needs or interests to weigh, and no disagreements over 
particular discovery requests to resolve. As noted in Part II, ap-
proximately 93 percent of foreign tribunal requests come from civil 
law countries,190 where discovery is primarily a judicial function.191 
Nor is a district court entertaining a foreign tribunal request 
playing its usual screening role under § 1782. The statute re-
quires that the requested discovery be “for use in a proceeding in 
a foreign or international tribunal.”192 Three out of the four dis-
cretionary factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Intel—
whether the discovery is available to the foreign tribunal without 
US court assistance, whether the foreign tribunal will be recep-
tive to US court assistance, and whether the discovery request is 
an attempt to circumvent foreign discovery restrictions—weigh 
the likelihood that granting the request will offend a foreign tri-
bunal.193 When the request is made by the foreign tribunal, it can 
be inferred that the discovery is for use in the proceeding it is 
adjudicating, and that the three comity-oriented Intel discretion-
ary factors are met. Some courts acknowledge that these analyses 
collapse when the request comes from a foreign tribunal, while 
others parrot standard conclusory language that the Intel factors 
weigh in favor of granting the request.194 
 
 188 See In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave NE, Bellevue, Wash, 634 F3d 557, 566 
(9th Cir 2011) (likening a discovery request from the Russian government to “an order 
enforcing the subpoenas of independent administrative agencies, an order granting a sub-
poena in aid of an extradition proceeding, and an order to appear before the Internal Rev-
enue Service”). 
 189 Pfander and Birk, 124 Yale L J at 1379 (cited in note 186). See also United States 
v Markwood, 48 F3d 969, 976–77 (6th Cir 1995) (emphasizing that “a “district court’s role 
in the enforcement of an administrative subpoena is a limited one” consisting of determin-
ing whether the agency has met statutory and judicially created standards for issuing and 
enforcing the subpoena). 
 190 See Table 2. 
 191 See, for example, John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 
52 U Chi L Rev 823, 827 (1985) (noting that in Germany, “[d]igging for facts is primarily 
the work of the judge”). 
 192 28 USC § 1782. 
 193 See Intel, 542 US at 264–65. 
 194 Compare In re Clerici, 481 F3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir 2007) (explaining that the 
Intel factors for receptivity and noncircumvention supported granting the request “given 
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Not only are the bases for a district court’s usual exercise of 
jurisdiction under the FRCP and § 1782 inapposite, but for the 
approximately 86 percent of tribunal requests coming from coun-
tries for which the Hague Evidence Convention is in force with 
respect to the United States,195 district courts are further limited 
to a handful of permissible reasons for denying requests.196 This 
restriction under international law is not altered by the Conven-
tion’s internal execution through a preexisting general-use stat-
ute that is discretionary.197 For all of these reasons, the very low 
contestation rates and very high grant rates observed—typically 
with minimal judicial activity, the order granting the request be-
ing the only order issued by the court—are, for the most part, jus-
tified. These observations suggest that judges are highly deferen-
tial to the Hague Evidence Convention and, by extension, foreign 
tribunals, granting their requests more or less as a matter of 
course.198 Conversely, judges occasionally exceed their discretion 
by denying tribunal requests in violation of international law.199 
 
that the foreign tribunal here is the Panamanian Court and the Panamanian Court itself 
issued the letter rogatory requesting assistance”), with Order, Request for International 
Judicial Assistance from the 12th Family Court in Istanbul, Turkey; Matter of Ekmekçi v 
Ekmekçi, No 1:15-mc-22425, *1 (SD Fla filed July 1, 2015) (“The statutory requirements 
set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) have been met. Furthermore, the additional factors to be 
considered . . . weigh in favor of granting the request.”), citing Intel, 542 US at 247. 
 195 See Table 2. 
 196 The permissible grounds for denying a discovery request under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention include if the request does not comply with Convention requirements 
(Article 5), if the request is for a matter that is not civil or commercial (Article 1), and if 
the country to which the request is addressed “considers that its sovereignty or security 
would be prejudiced thereby” (Article 12). Hague Evidence Convention Arts 1, 5, 12(b), 23 
UST at 2557, 2560, 2562. 
 197 See In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave, 634 F3d at 568, 570–72 (holding that 
the US-Russia Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty governing discovery assistance in criminal 
matters superseded § 1782’s grant of discretionary authority to district courts); Restate-
ment (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 309(2) (2013) (“When there 
is a conflict between a self-executing treaty provision and a federal statute, courts in the 
United States will apply whichever reflects the latest expression of the will of the U.S. 
political branches.”). 
 198 There were five tribunal requests that were denied in the random sample. All but 
one of the denials were for technical reasons, such as a technical defect in the application, 
and without prejudice. The last denial is discussed below in note 199. 
 199 See, for example, Transcript of Hearing on Petition for Judicial Review, In re Re-
quest for International Judicial Assistance from the National Court of First Instance in 
Labor Matters No 37 of Buenos Aires, Argentina, No 3:12-cv-00662, *4–8 (D Nev filed Sept 
16, 2013), (denying a tribunal request from Argentina in part due to the judge’s belief that 
the country from which the request originated did not honor American judgments and 
extradition requests—a ground for denial not permitted under the Convention). 
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C. Use by Foreign Parties 
When a district court receives a discovery request directly 
from a foreign party, it bears some resemblance to discovery 
within the United States. The request is coming from a party to a 
foreign proceeding against an adverse party, which parallels the 
bipolar structure of domestic discovery disputes. Perhaps because 
of this analogous structure, some courts are confident that their 
“substantial experience controlling discovery abuse in domestic 
litigation” prepares them for “similarly root[ing] out sham appli-
cations under § 1782.”200 It is assumed that district courts are best 
positioned to weigh the needs and interests of parties affected by 
a foreign discovery request, just as they are in domestic discovery 
requests,201 and that the FRCP’s safeguards are well-suited to 
prevent foreign misuse.202 Consequently, the same abuse of dis-
cretion standard of review for ordinary discovery rulings is ap-
plied to § 1782 rulings.203 
Yet, foreign discovery requests are distinctive in two key re-
spects. First, there are two courts involved in a foreign discovery 
request—the US court entertaining the discovery request, and 
the foreign court presiding over the action. Since the plenary suit 
is necessarily abroad, it is governed by a different set of proce-
dural rules. When a discovery request comes from a foreign party, 
it cannot be guaranteed that the foreign court or tribunal will ac-
cept US discovery under the FRCP as would another district court 
governed by the FRCP. Precisely for this reason, Intel set out 
three discretionary factors aimed at discerning whether the for-
eign court is receptive to exported discovery. Second, unlike do-
mestic out-of-district discovery requests targeting a nonparty and 
involving two district courts, there is no clear requirement for in-
forming or involving other parties to the foreign dispute or for 
consulting with the foreign court on subpoena-related motions. A 
foreign discovery request “stands separate from the main contro-
versy” in a heightened way.204 There is both a heightened need for 
information given procedural differences between countries, and 
 
 200 Glock v Glock, Inc, 797 F3d 1002, 1009 (11th Cir 2015). 
 201 In re Schlich, 893 F3d 40, 46 (1st Cir 2018), quoting Seattle Times Co v Rhinehart, 
467 US 20, 36 (1984). 
 202 A Bill to Revise, Codify, and Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code, Enti-
tled “Judicial Code and the Judiciary”, HR Rep No 79-2646, 79 Cong, 2d Sess A146 (1946). 
 203 Kang v Noro-Moseley Partners, 246 F Appx 662, 663 (11th Cir 2007). See also ProEn-
ergy Services, LLC, 677 F3d at 344; Nascimento v Faria, 600 F Appx 811, 812 (2d Cir 2015). 
 204 In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave, 634 F3d at 566 (quotation marks omitted). 
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a reduced supply of information due to the absence of procedures 
for consulting the foreign opposing party and the foreign court. 
Consequently, requests from foreign parties cause more compli-
cations than those from foreign tribunals. 
1. Missing stakeholders and information. 
There is an acute lack of clarity as to who should be informed, 
involved, or consulted when a district court receives a discovery 
request from a foreign party. Following precedents concerning 
discovery requests from foreign tribunals, many courts have held 
that it is proper for § 1782 applications to be made on an ex parte 
basis even when that application comes from a foreign party.205 
The rationale is usually that no prejudice will result because the 
target of the discovery will eventually have an opportunity to con-
test it once served with the subpoena.206 This reasoning does not 
distinguish between a discovery request that targets a party and 
one that targets a nonparty. It is the latter scenario that leaves 
the foreign adversary in the dark, preventing it from objecting to, 
monitoring, or seeking access to the requested discovery, as a do-
mestic adversary would be able to do.207 
Other courts have not condoned ex parte proceedings. But 
even when notification is required, courts do not agree on the le-
gal basis for, or the components of, the requirement. Some have 
applied FRCP 45’s requirement that all parties be notified of 
 
 205 See, for example, Gushlak v Gushlak, 486 F Appx 215, 217 (2d Cir 2012) (stating 
that “it is neither uncommon nor improper for district courts to grant applications made 
pursuant to § 1782 ex parte” and listing several examples); Order, Elkind v CCBill, LLC, 
No 2:14-mc-00030, *1 (D Ariz filed May 9, 2014) (granting ex parte request). 
 206 See, for example, In re Ex Parte Application of Société d’Etude de Réalisation et 
d’Exploitation pour le Traitement du Mais, 2013 WL 6164435, *2 n 1 (ED Pa) (explaining 
that ex parte applications under § 1782 are justified because the parties will be given ad-
equate notice of any discovery taken pursuant to the request and will then have the op-
portunity to move to quash the discovery); In re Letter of Request from Supreme Court of 
Hong Kong, 138 FRD 27, 32 n 6 (SDNY 1991) (“[S]uch ex parte applications are typically 
justified by the fact that the parties will be given adequate notice of any discovery taken 
pursuant to the request and will then have the opportunity to move to quash the discovery 
or to participate in it.”); Interbrew Central Europe Holding BV v Molson Coors Brewing 
Co, 2013 WL 5567504, *1 (D Colo) (finding that “Applicant’s ex parte request is appropri-
ately made and that Respondents may later seek modification of the discovery herein or-
dered by way of an appropriate motion”). 
 207 See Part III.A (discussing that FRCP 45 requires notification to all parties of dis-
covery requests targeting nonparties). 
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discovery requests targeting nonparties.208 Others have applied 
local rules concerning ex parte orders—for instance, the Central 
District of California’s rule mandating a memorandum explaining 
why a matter was brought ex parte.209 Yet others have required 
notice as a matter of judicial discretion since § 1782 does not pre-
scribe ex parte applications,210 or requested briefing on whether 
notice is needed.211 Some have even treated foreign discovery re-
quests as if they are full cases or controversies, extending FRCP 
Rule 4’s requirement that a plaintiff serve a summons and a copy 
of the complaint on the defendant.212 The specific notification re-
quirement has also varied: courts have ordered applicants to no-
tify the target of the discovery request,213 the adverse party in the 
 
 208 See In re Hornbeam Corp, 722 F Appx 7, 10–11 (2d Cir 2018) (applying 
FRCP 45(a)(4)’s notification requirements but nevertheless affirming the district court’s 
denial of a motion to vacate or quash and refusal to sanction the applicant due to lack of 
prejudice). 
 209 See, for example, Order by Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato, In re Ex Parte Ap-
plication of Nokia Corp, No 8:13-mc-00010, *1 (CD Cal filed May 15, 2013) (denying a 
§ 1782 request without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-19 governing ex 
parte applications in the Central District of California). 
 210 See, for example, In re Merck & Co, Inc, 197 FRD 267, 270–71 (MD NC 2000) 
(observing that “[n]othing in Section 1782 states that the application is to be made ex 
parte, much less that the Court must entertain the application ex parte,” and concluding 
that “nothing in Section 1782 prevents the Court in any given case from advancing the 
process by requiring the notification to take place at an earlier time in order to reduce 
disruption and conserve judicial resources”) (emphasis in original). 
 211 See, for example, Request to File Under Seal, In re Application of Lúcia de Araujo 
Bertolla for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Obtain Discovery for Use in a Foreign 
Proceeding, No 1:17-mc-00284, *1 (SDNY filed April 25, 2018) (Araujo Bertolla Request to 
File Under Seal) (explaining that the court requested the applicant brief the issue of why 
the federal rules’ subpoena notice requirement should not apply). 
 212 See, for example, Order to Show Cause, In re the Court Order of the Romford 
County Court of Great Britian Dated May 21, 2009, No 6-11-mc-00028, *1 (MD Fla filed 
May 6, 2011) (ordering the applicant to explain in writing why the target has not been 
served per a prior order and threatening sanctions as well as denial of the request). See 
also Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Investment Vehicles Managed by Affiliates of Fortress 
Investment Group LLC v KPMG LLP, No 1:14-cv-01801 (SDNY filed Mar 14, 2014), (issu-
ing a summons for a § 1782 request); Summons in a Civil Case, Blue Traffic Ltd v VT 
iDirect, Inc, No 1:08-mc-00031 (ED Va filed July 7, 2008) (same). For the text of this re-
quirement, see FRCP 4(c). 
 213 See, for example, Order, In re Application of Halliburton SAS, No 1:14-mc-00004, 
*2 (ED Va filed Feb 4, 2014) (Halliburton Application Order); In re Ex Parte Application 
of Apple, Inc, Apple Retail Germany GmBh; and Apple Sales International, No 3:12-cv-
00179, *1 (SD Cal filed Feb 1, 2012) (Apple Application Order); Order to Show Cause Why 
this Court Should Not Grant Ecuadorean Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Expedited 
Service and Enforcement of Subpoenas to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceed-
ing Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of Daniel Carlos Lusitand Yaiguaje, 
No 3:11-mc-80087, *2 (ND Cal filed May 9, 2011) (Yaiguaje Application Order). 
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foreign proceeding against whom the evidence is to be used,214 and 
the foreign court itself.215 Sometimes notice is not required but 
given as a matter of courtesy, with or without a written record. 
The confusion goes deeper: whether a foreign discovery re-
quest is a case or controversy is itself a question that has caused 
widespread discord across district courts, revealing uncertainty 
about the basic structure of these requests as well as the due pro-
cess and personal jurisdiction requirements attending them.216 As 
noted in Part II, more than a hundred cases were recategorized 
by district courts either from a miscellaneous case to a civil case 
or vice versa during the study period of 2005 to 2017.217 Miscella-
neous matters are typically ancillary or ex parte proceedings such 
as an out-of-district motion to compel or motion to quash, or the 
registration of a judgment from another district court.218 Civil 
matters are typically full cases or controversies between adver-
sarial parties that invoke all the protections of the FRCP, includ-
ing the requirement for a summons and service when a complaint 
is filed. That there is no case or controversy in the United States 
attached to foreign discovery requests has befuddled courts. 
The result of this confusion and the accompanying erratic no-
tification requirements are missing parties and stakeholders that 
ultimately deprive federal courts of the information they need to 
 
 214 See, for example, Halliburton Application Order at *2 (cited in note 213) (ordering 
that applicant provide notice to a number of relevant parties); Apple Application Order at 
*1 (cited in note 213) (same); Yaiguaje Application Order at *2 (cited in note 213) (same). 
 215 See, for example, Order, In re Application Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 of Financial 
Guaranty Insurance Co v Lehman Brothers, Inc, No 1:11-mc-00085, *2 (SDNY filed Mar 
29, 2011). 
 216 For background on the “case or controversy” requirement and its constitutional 
roots, see Martin H. Redish and Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the 
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U Chi L 
Rev 545, 563–66 (2006). 
 217 See Appendix C, Table 6. Compare Notice of New Case Number and Notice of 
Judge Assignment, In re Application of Hulley Enterprises Ltd, Yukos Universal Ltd, and 
Veteran Petroleum Ltd for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for 
Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No 2:17-mc-00088, *1 (CD Cal filed Sept 26, 2017) (case con-
verted from miscellaneous to civil); Order Directing the Clerk of Court to Redesignate this 
Matter as a Contested Civil Case for Statistical Purposes, In re Application of H.M.B. 
Limited Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 
No 1:17-cv-21459 (SD Fla filed May 1, 2018) (same), with Order, APR Energy Holdings 
Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, No 1:17-cv-02784, *1 (SDNY filed 
Apr 24, 2017) (case converted from civil to miscellaneous); Notice Regarding E-filing, In re 
Application of Akebia Therapeutics, Inc for an Order Granting Leave to Issue Subpoena for 
the Taking of Discovery Pursuant to 28 USC 1782, No 5:14-cv-04678, *1 (ND Cal filed Oct 
21, 2014) (same). 
 218 See, for example, US District Court Northern District of Texas, Electronic Case Fil-
ing: Opening a Miscellaneous Case 1 (Nov 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/Y9VU-KR2X. 
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conduct rigorous analyses. Because foreign discovery requests are 
frequently decided without the knowledge and input of the foreign 
adversary or the foreign court, the range of basic information that 
judges struggle to ascertain is staggering. They include: whether 
the foreign proceeding is civil or criminal;219 whether the foreign 
proceeding is on appeal;220 whether the requested discovery is rel-
evant to the foreign dispute;221 whether the foreign defendant has 
been served;222 the whereabouts of the foreign proceeding;223 the 
scope of discovery that is available in the country where the pro-
ceeding is being adjudicated;224 and whether a similar discovery 
request has already been denied in that country.225 The remainder 
of this Section examines how these missing stakeholders and this 
missing information impacts foreign litigation, basic notions of 
due process and fairness, and US litigation values. 
2. Undermining foreign tribunals and litigation. 
When the Supreme Court considered § 1782 in Intel, the 
Court stated that comity is “important as [a] touchstone[ ] for a 
district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases.”226 The 
Supreme Court laid out four discretionary factors for district 
courts to consider, three of which are directed toward ensuring 
deference to and avoiding interference with foreign tribunals.227 
The first factor is whether the foreign tribunal can itself order 
production of the evidence sought, or if it is unobtainable without 
 
 219 See In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switzerland GmBh, 742 F Appx 690, 697 (3d Cir 
2018) (noting that the lower court erred in concluding that discovery was sought for a 
criminal appeal when in fact it was sought for a civil trial proceeding). 
 220 See id. 
 221 See Order, In re Application of Raoul Malak, No 2:14-mc-00089, *4 (D Ariz filed Feb 
17, 2015) (Malak Application Order) (“[T]he Court lacks any meaningful information with 
which to determine whether the such [sic] discovery is relevant to the foreign proceeding.”). 
 222 See Memo Endorsement, In re Application of Gorsoan Ltd and Gazprombank 
OJSC for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign 
Proceeding, No 1:13-mc-00397, *1 (SDNY filed Oct 22, 2014). 
 223 See Memorandum and Order Regarding Intervenor’s Motion to Quash and to Va-
cate, In re: Application of Hanwha Azdel, Inc and Hanwha L&C Corp for Assistance Before 
a Foreign Tribunal, No 3:13-mc-93004, *2–4 (D Mass filed Oct 29, 2013). 
 224 See Marubeni America Corp v LBA Y.K., 335 F Appx 95, 97–98 (2d Cir 2009). 
 225 See In re Chevron Corp, 633 F3d 153, 162–63 (3d Cir 2011). 
 226 Intel, 542 US at 261. 
 227 The fourth discretionary factor and parity, which the Court also identified as “im-
portant as [a] touchstone[ ] for a district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases,” 
will be discussed in the following section. Id. See also Dodge, 115 Colum L Rev at 2105 
(cited in note 52) (noting that § 1782 is motivated by “adjudicative comity,” which the au-
thor defines as “deference to foreign courts”). 
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US court assistance.228 Because the underlying discovery request 
in Intel sought evidence from a party to the foreign proceeding, 
the Supreme Court focused on the party status of the discovery 
target, writing that “when the person from whom discovery is 
sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding . . . , the need for 
§ 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when 
evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising 
abroad.”229 The second factor is whether US discovery assistance 
is desired abroad, and the Supreme Court instructed district 
courts that they may consider “the nature of the foreign tribunal, 
the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the recep-
tivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to 
U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.”230 The third factor, related 
to the second, is whether the foreign discovery request “conceals 
an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.”231 
Due to the lack of input from foreign tribunals and foreign 
opposing parties in § 1782 proceedings, and the open-ended na-
ture of these factors,232 district courts have evolved simplified 
tests that lead to reflexive grants of foreign discovery requests. 
These simplified tests reflect Professor Maggie Gardner’s obser-
vation that the complex inquiries required in transnational cases 
encourage judges to develop analytical shortcuts that can lead to 
systemic bias favoring what is known (US parties and US law) 
over what is not known (foreign parties and foreign law).233 In the 
§ 1782 context, the simplified tests systematically tip the scale 
toward granting foreign discovery requests while failing to 
properly apply Intel’s discretionary factors. 
The first factor concerning whether the foreign tribunal can 
obtain the requested evidence without US assistance is often sim-
plified to ask whether the target of the discovery request is a 
party or nonparty to the foreign proceeding. This analysis is eas-
ier to manage judicially, leading many courts to recite standard 
language that discovery is favored because it is sought from a 
 
 228 See Intel, 542 US at 264. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id at 265. 
 232 See Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Investment Vehicles v KPMG, LLP, 798 F3d 
113, 118 (2d Cir 2015) (commenting that the Intel opinion does not provide guidance on 
“minimum requirements or tests to be met”). 
 233 See Gardner, 69 Stan L Rev at 959–64 (cited in note 86). 
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nonparty.234 In fact, many discovery requests strategically target 
a token nonparty although the same evidence is also held by a 
party to the foreign proceeding. These token nonparties include 
American corporate affiliates of the foreign opposing party235 and 
American law firms that have represented foreign clients in US 
litigation.236 Most recently, the Second Circuit reversed a lower 
court’s grant of a § 1782 petition ordering Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore LLP to turn over documents in aid of litigation in the Neth-
erlands.237 The reversal was based not on fears of interfering with 
the foreign litigation but rather on concern that granting the re-
quest would undermine attorney-client communications in the 
United States as well as confidence in protective orders.238 In the 
absence of information from foreign courts, it is easier to locate a 
 
 234 See, for example, Order Granting Application in Part for Judicial Assistance Pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of Lúcia De Araujo Bertolla for an Order 
Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Obtain Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No 1:17-
mc-00284, *2 (SDNY filed Nov 13, 2017) (“[T]he Discovery Targets are not parties in the 
proceedings in Brazil and are not expected to become parties thereto, thus, the need for 
this discovery is more apparent.”); Omnibus Report and Recommendations on Motions to 
Intervene, Vacate, Quash Subpoenas, and for Protective Order, In re Application of H.M.B. 
Limited Pursuant to 28 USC 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 
No 1:17-cv-21459, *17 (SD Fla filed July 2, 2018) (refusing to “look beyond the subpoenaed 
party to ascertain the true target of discovery”) (emphasis in original). But see In the Mat-
ter of a Petition for Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 by Macquarie Bank 
Ltd, 2015 WL 3439103, *6 (D Nev) (arguing that the first discretionary factor “militates 
against allowing § 1782 discovery when the petitioner effectively seeks discovery from a 
participant in the foreign tribunal even though it is seeking discovery from a related, but 
technically distinct entity”); Order, In re Application of Parmalat Brasil S.A. Industrial de 
Alimentos and LAEP Investments, Ltd for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct 
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No 1:11-mc-00077, *6 (SDNY filed July 26, 2011) 
(Parmalat Application) (concluding that the first factor is neutral because “whether those 
same documents are obtainable in Brazil is, at this juncture, unknown”). 
 235 See, for example, Bravo Express Corp v Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc, 
613 F Appx 319, 320–21 (5th Cir 2015) (seeking discovery from US targets that had a 
corporate relationship and joint business operations with the entities that were involved 
in the underlying disputed acts); Application for an Order Directing ASML US, Inc. to 
Respond to Requests for Documents Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 For Use in Foreign Pro-
ceedings, and Supporting Memorandum, In re Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 
of Nikon Corp, No 1:17-mc-00142, *8 (SDNY filed Apr 26, 2017) (seeking discovery from 
the wholly owned subsidiary of the opposing party in the foreign action). 
 236 See, for example, In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F Supp 2d 294, 296 (SDNY 
2003) (“Application of section 1782 does not involve an analysis of . . . why a respondent 
has the documents.”); Ex Parte Application for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 
Granting Leave to Obtain Discovery from Quinn Emanuel for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 
In re Ex Parte Application of Apple, Inc, No 5:12-mc-80124, *1 (ND Cal filed May 25, 2012). 
 237 See Kiobel by Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F3d 238, 241 (2d 
Cir 2018), cert denied, 139 S Ct 852 (2019) (noting that the sought-after documents were 
sent by Shell to the United States “solely . . . for the purpose of American litigation”). 
 238 See id at 241, 246–47. 
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domestic rationale than a foreign one for limiting a doctrine 
whose primary effect is abroad. 
Focusing on the nonparty status of the discovery target leads 
to a particularly absurd result when the discovery that is sought 
is in fact located abroad. While the drafters of § 1782 did not an-
ticipate the statute to be used extraterritorially,239 some courts 
have compelled discovery from the very country where the foreign 
dispute is being adjudicated, because the FRCP reach documents 
and other tangible things “in the possession, custody, or control” 
of the discovery target.240 Such extraterritorial discovery is typi-
cally obtainable by the foreign court, and seeking it in the United 
States should raise strong suspicions of the applicant sidestep-
ping foreign discovery restrictions. 
The second and third factors concerning receptivity and 
whether a discovery request is an attempt to circumvent foreign 
proof-gathering restrictions are often considered in tandem and 
have resulted in a number of analytical shortcuts that effectively 
write these factors out of existence. The most prominent among 
them is burden shifting, since Intel did not specify burdens. Many 
district courts have held that the target resisting discovery must 
provide “authoritative proof” that the foreign court is not recep-
tive.241 Authoritative proof of a negative is hard to come by, 
 
 239 See Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International 
Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J Intl L & Com-
merce 1, 10–12 (1998) (noting that allowing such discovery is likely to interfere with for-
eign court processes while making the United States the “clearing house[ ]” for information 
“all over the world”). 
 240 See Sergeeva v Tripleton International Ltd, 834 F3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir 2016) 
(holding that § 1782 reaches “responsive documents and information located outside the 
United States” so long as it is within the “possession, custody, or control of” the discovery 
target); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F3d 520, 524 (2d Cir 2019) (holding that “there is no per 
se bar to the extraterritorial application of § 1782”). See also FRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). But see 
Pinchuk v Chemstar Products LLC, 2014 WL 2990416, *4 (D Del) (quashing a discovery 
request for documents located abroad). 
 241 There is a multiway split in the courts on the question of who bears the burden of 
showing receptivity or the lack thereof. Compare Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v Chevron Corp, 
619 F3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir 2010); Chevron, 633 F3d at 162 (holding that relevant evi-
dence is “presumptively discoverable” unless the party opposing discovery shows offense 
to the foreign jurisdiction); In re MTS Bank, 2017 WL 3155362, *6 (SD Fla) (“[C]ourts look 
for authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid 
of § 1782.”) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original), with Foda v Capital Health, 
2010 WL 2925382, *2 (ND Cal) (placing the burden of proof on the applicant); In re Appli-
cation of Chevron Corp, 762 F Supp 2d 242, 252 (D Mass 2010) (noting that the targets of 
foreign discovery requests “are often individuals plucked out of their repose who may . . . 
not necessarily [have] the wherewithal to mount a defense to an application, let alone . . . 
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particularly where the discovery target is a US nonparty to the 
foreign litigation, who likely has no information about the foreign 
tribunal adjudicating the dispute abroad. Other analytical 
shortcuts that district courts have taken include: inferring that 
membership in the Hague Evidence Convention signals receptiv-
ity to US discovery242 despite the fact that nearly all Convention 
members have submitted a declaration objecting to pretrial dis-
covery as such discovery is mandated by the FRCP;243 and relying 
on prior federal court decisions concluding that a foreign country 
is receptive without looking more deeply at how those courts ar-
rived at their conclusion.244 
The overarching result of these simplified tests is that dis-
trict courts are reflexively granting foreign discovery requests be-
cause the comity-based discretionary factors are not gauging 
whether exported US discovery is assisting or interfering with 
foreign proceedings. Instead, appellate courts have instructed dis-
trict courts that it is preferable to modify a request on the basis 
that it is too burdensome rather than deny or quash a request 
altogether.245 Information about the burden imposed by a discov-
ery request is more readily available since it can be furnished by 
the local US target of the discovery, providing another example of 
how the absence of foreign courts and foreign parties in § 1782 
proceedings results in domestic rationale driving a doctrine 
whose primary effect is abroad. If all else fails, courts reason that 
 
prove a negative, i.e., a foreign tribunal’s non receptivity to the discovery sought”) (em-
phasis in original), Department of Caldas v Diageo PLC, 925 F3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir 
2019) (taking a “middle-of-the-road approach” that does not apply a rigid burden-shifting 
framework); Order, In re Application of Digitechnic, No 2:07-cv-00414, *6–7 (WD Wash 
filed May 8, 2007) (not placing the burden on either side). 
 242 See, for example, In re O’Keeffe, 646 F Appx 263, 266–68 (3d Cir 2016) (affirming 
district court’s conclusion that Hague Evidence Convention being in effect between United 
States and Hong Kong was sufficient indication that Hong Kong courts would be receptive 
to American judicial assistance). See also In re Servicio Pan Americano de Protección, 354 
F Supp 2d 269, 274 (SDNY 2004) (“Venezuela has indicated its receptivity to federal judi-
cial assistance by its signature of treaties facilitating such cooperation.”). 
 243 See note 84 and accompanying text. 
 244 See, for example, Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Order to Obtain Dis-
covery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, In re Ex Parte Application of ANZ Commodity Trad-
ing Party Ltd, No 4:17-mc-80070, *6 (ND Cal filed Aug 4, 2017) (relying on cases cited by 
applicant in which US courts had previously granted foreign discovery requests from Hong 
Kong to conclude that Hong Kong is receptive). 
 245 See, for example, Bravo Express, 613 F Appx at 325 (“[M]odification of a subpoena 
is preferable to quashing it outright, and a district court abuses its discretion when it does 
not explain its reasoning, does not allow the applicant an opportunity to cure any defects, 
and does not attempt to modify the subpoena to cure any overbreadth.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
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the foreign tribunal can simply disregard the discovery compelled 
by a US court,246 neglecting the judicial and private resources 
wasted, as well as the fact that foreign countries lacking broad 
discovery provisions typically do not have admissibility rules. 
That judges usually do not have any information about what hap-
pens to discovery after they compel it for foreign use amplifies 
this problem. 
3. Undermining universal and American litigation values. 
Not only are there inadequate safeguards for protecting 
against compelling discovery that interferes with foreign litiga-
tion, the way in which foreign discovery requests are considered 
also undermines universal notions of due process and fairness as 
well as deeply held American litigation values. Federal courts are 
typically permitted to hear “definite and concrete” controversies 
affecting “the legal relations of parties having adverse legal inter-
ests.”247 While ex parte proceedings can be a legitimate exercise of 
Article III power, they pose potential risks to the rights of absent 
parties.248 Accordingly, federal courts must be particularly vigi-
lant about protecting those parties, and due process requires that 
absent parties receive notice of proceedings that concern them, as 
well as an opportunity to participate.249 Noncontentious jurisdic-
tion ends, or at least must be moderated, where a judgment en-
croaches on the rights of parties not before the court.250 Modera-
tion may require judges to play a more active role, for instance by 
conducting their own factual investigation and framing the legal 
issues, since they cannot rely on an adverse party to do so.251 
When foreign discovery requests proceed ex parte, they raise 
all the alarms that ex parte proceedings usually do. The presence 
of a nonparty target does not assuage these concerns, as nonparty 
targets do not have the same interest in resisting discovery as 
 
 246 See, for example, Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F3d at 597 (“German judges can disregard 
evidence that would waste the court’s time.”); In re Ex Parte Application of Nokia Corp, 
2013 WL 6073457, *3 (ND Cal) (“[T]he German court can exclude evidence of marginal 
probative value.”). 
 247 Aetna Life Insurance Co v Haworth, 300 US 227, 240–41 (1937). 
 248 See Pfander and Birk, 124 Yale L J at 1357 (cited in note 186). 
 249 See id at 1358. 
 250 See id at 1450 n 490 (noting that “the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause may 
provide a more effective instrument for moderating non-contentious forms than a strict 
adherence to an adverse-party rule that would foreclose the exercise of all judicial power 
over such matters”). 
 251 See id at 1446. 
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might the opposing party and often cooperate with the requestor, 
agreeing to a joint protective order that protects the confidentiality 
of the discovered materials instead of opposing the request it-
self.252 Sometimes the nonparty target even brings the application 
on behalf of the foreign applicant.253 The foreign adversary 
against whom the requested discovery is to be used is an obvious 
absent party whose rights are affected. The adverse-party re-
quirement articulated by the Supreme Court,254 the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and universal conceptions of fair-
ness require that foreign adverse parties be notified of the pro-
ceeding and provided an opportunity to participate. Were the ad-
verse parties located in the United States, these requirements 
would be set out in FRCP 45. But because the adverse parties and 
the plenary dispute is abroad, courts have not consistently ap-
plied any notification requirement, and, on the contrary, have 
even debated whether the opposing adversary has standing to 
participate.255 
Although a foreign tribunal is not an absent party, compelled 
discovery in the United States can also alter a foreign tribunal’s 
ability to manage litigation before it. Notifying and involving the 
foreign tribunal is justified on this ground. Moreover, it is the type 
of factual investigation a US judge should undertake when faced 
with an ex parte § 1782 request. Were the foreign tribunal a dif-
ferent district court in the United States, consultation with the 
tribunal—and potentially also transfer of subpoena-related mo-
tions back to it—would be, respectively, encouraged and 
 
 252 See, for example, Order Granting Joint Motion for a Protective Order, In the Mat-
ter of Miasto Poznañ v Skarb Panstwa, No 1:15-mc-00179 (D Colo filed Jan 7, 2016). A 
high degree of cooperation typically occurs when the nonparty target is a bank or social 
media company that is willing to comply with the request but needs a § 1782 order to 
justify compliance to the client whose information is being released. See also Neil A.F. 
Popovic and Shin Hahn, Pursuing and Responding to Discovery Requests Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1782 (Lexology, Mar 29, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/XD6Y-4R5D. 
 253 See, for example, Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Comcast Cable Communica-
tions, LLC v Hourani, No 1:15-cv-01724, *2–4 (DDC filed Oct 19, 2015). 
 254 See Aetna Life, 300 US at 240–41. 
 255 Compare In re Kleimar N.V. v Benxi Iron and Steel America, Ltd, 2017 WL 
3386115, *4 (ND Ill) (“[T]here is no question that an entity against whom the discovery 
will be used has standing to challenge an order allowing discovery under § 1782.”), with 
Order, In re Application of Chevron, No 1:10-mc-00001, *1 (SDNY filed Aug 24, 2010) (not-
ing that the plaintiffs in the foreign proceeding for which discovery was sought, “whose 
standing in this matter is debatable to say the least,” had moved to strike some of the 
filings submitted by § 1782 applicant, who happened to be the defendant in the foreign 
proceeding). 
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permitted under FRCP 45. But because the tribunal is located 
abroad, courts have, on occasion, precluded its participation.256 
Without adversity and the typical due process accorded to 
parties whose legal interests might be harmed, § 1782 proceed-
ings are often characterized by unfairness and a lack of parity 
between the parties to the foreign dispute. In Intel, the Supreme 
Court instructed district courts to consider parity a “touch-
stone[ ]” for its exercise of discretion, and noted that a district 
court could condition its grant of a discovery request on the appli-
cant’s reciprocal exchange of information.257 Yet, compelling dis-
covery in the United States conditioned on a reciprocal exchange 
of information poses more problems than it solves. For one thing, 
that reciprocal discovery is usually located abroad outside of the 
jurisdiction of US courts, and requires district courts to effectively 
order extraterritorial discovery that the foreign court could itself 
order and thus is likely to be perceived as interference.258 For an-
other thing, when US discovery is sought from a nonparty to the 
foreign dispute, there is no way for the district court to ensure 
parity since the nonparty has no use for reciprocal discovery and 
the adverse party is not before the court. 
Moreover, district courts typically do not consider parity at 
all, occasionally leading to inconsistent and unfair results within 
the United States. In a set of three related foreign discovery re-
quests spanning nearly a decade, two were granted to Heraeus 
Kulzer, a German company, for use against its competitor Biomet 
with which it was embroiled in litigation in both Germany and 
Switzerland.259 Years later, a district court in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania denied a discovery request brought by Biomet for 
use against Heraeus Kulzer in related litigation, a decision that 
 
 256 See, for example, Memorandum and Order, In re Application of Microsoft Corp, 
No 1:06-mc-10061, *6 n 4 (D Mass filed Apr 17, 2006) (Microsoft Memorandum and Order) 
(denying the European Commission’s motion to intervene on the grounds that its views 
have already been received and represented by Novell, Inc, the nonparty target of the 
§ 1782 request). 
 257 Intel, 542 US at 261–62. 
 258 See, for example, In re Application of Consorcio Minero, S.A. v Renco Group, Inc, 
2012 WL 1059916, *4 (SDNY) (granting reciprocal discovery in Peru); Minatec Finance 
S.À.R.L. v SI Group Inc, 2008 WL 3884374, *9 (NDNY) (granting reciprocal discovery lo-
cated in Luxembourg). 
 259 See Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F3d at 595–99; Kulzer v Esschem, Inc, 390 F Appx 88, 89–
90 (3d Cir 2010). 
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was later vacated in part due to parity concerns.260 In fact, foreign 
parties regularly make not one but numerous discovery requests 
in the United States, and since there is no requirement for appli-
cants to inform district courts of related requests, it is difficult to 
ensure consistency even across a single foreign proceeding.261 This 
is particularly so given the number of splits among the courts on 
issues of law now plaguing § 1782. 
Aside from undermining adverseness, due process, and par-
ity between the foreign parties, the lack of information about the 
underlying foreign proceeding also frustrates the usual discovery 
analyses judges are expected to conduct. In particular, judges of-
ten have no reliable way of ascertaining whether the requested 
discovery is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”262 They do 
not usually attempt any proportionality analysis. Many of the 
proportionality factors are already difficult to gauge in the domestic 
context, and entirely impossible to gauge in the international con-
text without input from the foreign court and the foreign adver-
sary. For instance, a US federal judge has no basis for under-
standing “the importance of the issues at stake in the action,” 
which means the social, philosophical, or institutional signifi-
cance of the substantive issues in the case263—matters bound up 
 
 260 See In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switzerland GmBh, 742 F Appx at 699 (refusing to 
accept Heraeus’s argument that Biomet’s discovery request should not be granted due to 
potential exposure of trade secrets because “Heraeus [had] gained access to wide swaths 
of Biomet’s potentially proprietary information through its own 1782 discovery requests 
in the Northern District of Indiana and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania”). 
 261 See, for example, Astronics Advanced Electronics Systems Corp v Lufthansa Tech-
nik AG, 561 F Appx 605, 606 (9th Cir 2014) (discussing competing § 1782 requests from 
adverse parties to the same foreign proceeding). But see Republic of Ecuador v Connor, 
708 F3d 651, 658 (5th Cir 2013) (relying on judicial estoppel to prevent an applicant from 
taking advantage of a circuit split). 
 262 FRCP 26(b)(1). See also, for example, Malak Application Order at *4 (cited in note 
221) (“[T]he Court lacks any meaningful information with which to determine whether the 
such [sic] discovery is relevant to the foreign proceeding.”); Order Re: Application for Dis-
covery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, MetaLab Design Ltd v Zozi International, Inc, 
No 3:17-mc-80153, *6 & n 1 (ND Cal filed Jan 11, 2018) (concluding that the requested 
evidence “may be relevant” to the requestor’s counterclaims, but noting in a footnote that 
the court could not determine whether the applicant’s assertion that the discovery would 
allow it “to defend the Canadian Action” was “in fact the case”); Alexander v Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, 194 FRD 316, 325 (DDC 2000) (changing the relevance standard to 
include that which “bears on, or that [which] reasonably leads to other matters that could 
bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case”). 
 263 FRCP 26(b)(1). The proportionality analysis was originally introduced in 1983. 
The corresponding committee notes explained that “the rule recognizes that many cases 
in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, 
may have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.” FRCP 26, Notes of the 
Advisory Committee on Rules—1983 Amendment, Note to Subdivision (b). 
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in the social fabric of the foreign country. Nor do they have much 
visibility into the parties’ comparative resources or access to rel-
evant information, or the importance of the discovery requested 
in resolving the case. The fear that federal judges do not have 
nearly as much facility with the facts as do the parties in a do-
mestic discovery dispute264 is amplified many times over when 
discovery is requested for a foreign dispute. Whether requested 
discovery is relevant in foreign discovery requests is further com-
plicated by the lack of information about whether it is possible for 
US discovery to be put to any sort of use abroad. For all of these 
reasons, some courts have noted that ex parte foreign discovery 
proceedings undercut “evenhanded justice and a sense of fair 
treatment”265 while making it more difficult for judges to make 
decisions.266 
IV.  REIMAGINING GLOBAL DISCOVERY 
The export of American discovery needs reform. Foreign dis-
covery requests have been rapidly on the rise over the past decade 
and a half, and foreign party requests, in particular, have ex-
ceeded tribunal requests in most recent years.267 The previous 
Part laid out the many problems that arise when extending the 
FRCP to the international context. The problems are mild when 
district courts compel discovery at the request of foreign tribu-
nals, and severe when they compel discovery at the request of for-
eign parties. Foreign parties now have a more direct relationship 
with federal courts than do foreign tribunals, and they have made 
more creative, heterogeneous, and dynamic use of § 1782.268 
Meanwhile, federal judges are increasingly at an informational 
disadvantage as they adjudicate foreign discovery requests with 
little information about the plenary dispute abroad. This Part of-
fers several proposals aimed at improving the operation of party 
requests. 
Beginning with the most straightforward and achievable re-
forms, I call for more active judicial management of § 1782 re-
quests so that Intel’s discretionary factors can be sincerely 
 
 264 See Massen, 83 S Cal L Rev at 883 (cited in note 40) (noting that in the United States, 
“litigants control most aspects of discovery while the judge’s role is limited to defining the 
outer boundaries of the proof-gathering process while avoiding active participation”). 
 265 Merck & Co, 197 FRD at 270. 
 266 See Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Investment Vehicles, 798 F3d at 125. 
 267 See Part II. 
 268 See id. 
2020] Exporting American Discovery 2147 
 
applied rather than merely paid lip service. To that end, I suggest 
that federal courts systematically invite the participation of for-
eign tribunals and foreign opposing parties. Because these 
changes are needed to follow the Supreme Court’s directives in 
Intel, they can be adopted immediately by federal judges—as 
some already have. But their consistent application across the 
country will require the addition of a new Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure and moderate amendments to § 1782. This is particu-
larly important given that over 60 percent of federal district courts 
received foreign discovery requests during the study period.269 
Next, I suggest restructuring foreign discovery requests such 
that they are no longer treated as stand-alone actions in US 
courts. Instead, requiring that all discovery requests related to 
the same foreign proceeding be brought as a single unified US 
action before the same federal judge will improve administrabil-
ity, facilitate active judicial management, and reduce internally 
inconsistent and unfair results. 
A. Seeking the Participation of Foreign Tribunals 
The Supreme Court held in Intel that comity is a policy con-
cern that district courts should address in their exercise of discre-
tion. Accordingly, three of the four discretionary factors set out in 
Intel are aimed at avoiding offense to foreign tribunals. Yet, the 
European Commission opposed Intel’s prescription of case-by-
case judicial discretion on the basis that a district court “can only 
weigh fairly the complex interests of a foreign sovereign in aiding 
or blocking a Section 1782 discovery request if it is made aware 
of those interests.”270 “[S]o far as the Commission is aware,” it ar-
gued, “there is no system for providing it with notice of Sec-
tion 1782 cases in which its interests are at stake, much less any 
regular procedure through which the Commission might appear 
and make those interests known.”271 The analysis above con-
firmed the European Commission’s suspicion that district courts 
would not be able to discern the interests of foreign tribunals 
without their input. 
Meaningfully implementing Intel’s discretionary factors re-
quires more active judicial management of foreign discovery re-
quests by federal courts and more active participation from 
 
 269 See Part II.A. 
 270 European Commission Brief at *17 (cited in note 28). 
 271 Id. 
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foreign tribunals. Federal judges can accomplish this by systemat-
ically providing written notice to foreign tribunals when § 1782 
requests are received and sua sponte seeking the tribunals input. 
District courts may specifically ask foreign tribunals to weigh in 
on the Intel factors, to provide information needed to apply the 
FRCP’s proportionality analysis, or to share scheduling infor-
mation so that US discovery can be produced in time for it to be 
taken into consideration abroad. As noted in Part II, many foreign 
discovery requests are currently filed while the foreign litigation 
is pending but reach no resolution because the foreign litigation 
is resolved before the application is decided.272 
Notification and consultation of foreign tribunals is even 
more critical in those instances where evidence is requested for 
multiple parallel proceedings occurring around the world. Recall 
that approximately 28 percent of foreign party requests are for 
evidence to be used in multiple foreign proceedings, which may 
include a US proceeding.273 Even when additional foreign proceed-
ings are not identified in the initial request, entrepreneurial liti-
gants now use discovery obtained through § 1782 in multiple pro-
ceedings before multiple tribunals once the statute’s 
requirements are deemed satisfied with respect to one foreign 
proceeding.274 Each of those proceedings and their respective 
courts or tribunals would be affected by compelled US discovery, 
and their participation is needed to avoid confusion, duplication, 
and abuse. In addition to whether US discovery should be com-
pelled and on what timeline, courts will likely need to consult with 
each other on issues of privilege and protective orders that would 
subsequently limit the use of the materials produced. A joint pro-
tective order agreed to by the parties and approved by a court in 
one jurisdiction will have externalities in other jurisdictions. 
Some district courts have already begun taking a more active 
stance toward foreign discovery requests. They have, for instance, 
provided notice to foreign tribunals,275 corresponded directly with 
 
 272 See Appendix C, Table 14 (showing a steady number of cases every year that reach 
no resolution). 
 273 See Part II. 
 274 See In re Accent Delight International Ltd, 869 F3d 121, 135 (2d Cir 2017) (holding 
that § 1782 “does not prevent an applicant who lawfully has obtained discovery under the 
statute with respect to one foreign proceeding form using the discovery elsewhere unless 
the district court orders otherwise”). 
 275 See, for example, Order, In re Application Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 of Financial 
Guaranty Insurance Co v Lehman Brothers, Inc, No 1:11-mc-00085, *2 (SDNY filed Mar 
29, 2011). 
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foreign judges regarding compelled evidence,276 delayed their de-
cision pending foreign court action,277 ordered and received status 
reports on foreign proceedings,278 examined documents submitted 
to foreign tribunals,279 and sought rulings from foreign courts.280 
Some foreign tribunals have also started taking more active 
part in § 1782 proceedings either directly or through private par-
ties. The Korean Fair Trade Commission, for example, filed let-
ters to the court in seven foreign discovery requests in the North-
ern District of California.281 These letters asserted that the 
Korean Fair Trade Commission was not receptive to US discovery 
related to disputes between Qualcomm and Apple. Similarly, the 
European Commission sought to intervene and to file a memoran-
dum in support of a motion to quash a § 1782 subpoena in the 
 
 276 See, for example, Letter from Paul A. Crotty, US District Judge, to Judge Enrique 
Claudio González Meyenberg, In re Operación y Supervisión de Hoteles, S.A. de C.V., 
No 1:15-mc-00172 (SDNY filed Aug 12, 2015); Letter from Paul A. Crotty, US District 
Judge, to Judge Enrique Claudio González Meyenberg, In re Operación y Supervisión de 
Hoteles, S.A. de C.V., No 1:15-mc-00172 (SDNY filed Sept 4, 2015). 
 277 See, for example, Araujo Bertolla Request to File Under Seal at *3 (cited in note 
211); Matter of the Application of Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Ltd, 2016 
WL 5339803, *1 (ND Cal) (denying discovery as to one witness but stating that the court 
may revisit the issue after the Australian court decides pending motion about discovery 
from that witness); Order, In re Ex Parte Application of Banco Safra for an Order Pursuant 
to 28 USC Section 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No 1:16-mc-
21971, *3–4 (SD Fla filed Sept 8, 2016) (giving respondents opportunity to obtain Brazilian 
court decision regarding their asserted privileges and instructing them to submit a status 
report regarding their prospective request for declaratory relief in Brazil); Parmalat Ap-
plication at *5–8 (cited in note 234) (staying discovery request pending further action from 
Brazilian court). 
 278 See, for example, Order Directing Mentor Graphics Corporation to File Status Re-
port, In re Application of Mentor Graphics Corp, No 5:16-mc-80037, *1 (ND Cal filed June 
15, 2016); Ching Chung Taoist Association, 2016 WL 5339803 at *3 (noting that the appli-
cant provided notice to court regarding status of underlying foreign proceeding). 
 279 See, for example, Memorandum and Order on Petition for Discovery for Use in 
Foreign Proceedings Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of George W. Schlich, 
No 1:16-mc-91278, *1–4 (D Mass filed Dec 9, 2016) (examining submissions from both 
sides to the European Patent Office). 
 280 See, for example, Order, In re Application of Jurema Dimas de Melo Pimenta and 
Dimas de Melo Pimenta Filho Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 For Judicial Assistance in Ob-
taining Evidence in This District, No 1:12-mc-24043, *1–2 (SD Fla filed Jan 29, 2013) (or-
dering movant to seek ruling or guidance from Brazilian court). 
 281 See, for example, Letter from Korea Fair Trade Commission, In re Ex Parte Appli-
cation of Qualcomm Inc, No 5:16-mc-80002, *1 (ND Cal filed Jan 26, 2016); Letter From 
Korea Fair Trade Commission, In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, No 5:16-mc-
80008, *1 (ND Cal filed Jan 26, 2016); Letter From Korea Fair Trade Commission, In re 
Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, No 5:16-mc-80005, *1 (ND Cal filed Jan 26, 2016). 
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District of Massachusetts.282 In more than one instance, German 
authorities weighed in against the production of evidence in the 
United States,283 while in another instance, a German court not 
only expressed receptivity to but postponed its own hearing to 
permit a litigant to pursue discovery requests in Indiana and 
Pennsylvania.284 A Swiss arbitrator has conveyed nonreceptivity 
to US discovery,285 while an Israeli arbitrator has expressed re-
ceptivity to US discovery.286 Foreign litigants have also submitted 
letters from judges in Monaco and Germany noting that they 
would consider discovery compelled in the United States.287 
These existing ad hoc attempts at fostering foreign tribunal 
participation in § 1782 proceedings reveal that the needs of trans-
national discovery are not easily generalizable, for they are too 
specific and fine-tuned to be addressed by blanket rules. A Ger-
man judge may find US discovery assistance helpful in one pro-
ceeding but not in another. A broad-stroke solution covering an 
entire country, or a type of foreign proceeding such as private 
commercial arbitration, is unlikely to further the goal of 
 
 282 Motion of the Commission of the European Communities to Intervene, In re Ap-
plication of Microsoft Corporation, No 1:06-mc-10061, *1 (D Mass filed Apr 6, 2006); Mem-
orandum of the Commission of the European Communities in Support of Novell, Inc.’s 
Motion to Quash, In re Application of Microsoft Corp, No 1:06-mc-10061, *1 (D Mass filed 
Apr 6, 2006). The motion to intervene was denied on the basis that the European Commis-
sion’s views were already represented by the other parties. See Microsoft Memorandum 
and Order at *6 n 4 (cited in note 256). 
 283 See In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F Supp 2d 294, 297 (SDNY 2003) (describing 
the intervention by the German Federal Ministry of Justice); In re Winkler, 2005 US Dist 
LEXIS 46937, *1–2 (SDNY) (same). 
 284 See Kulzer v Esschem, Inc, 390 F Appx 88, 92 (3d Cir 2010) (noting that although 
the German court at issue could not itself order the sought-after discovery due to German 
procedural rules, the court “does not restrict receipt of the evidence sought and in fact has 
postponed a hearing scheduled for April 15, 2010 to September 30, 2010, specifically for 
the purpose of permitting [the applicant] extra time to pursue its discovery requests in 
Indiana and Pennsylvania”). 
 285 See El Paso Corp v La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa, 341 F 
Appx 31, 32 (5th Cir 2009) (“The arbitral tribunal issued an order expressing its views on 
the § 1782 application, noting that it was not receptive to these discovery efforts.”). 
 286 See In re Hallmark Capital Corp, 534 F Supp 2d 951, 957 (D Minn 2007) (“[T]he 
Israeli arbitrator has stated his ‘receptivity’ to this Court’s assistance.”). 
 287 See In re Application of Accent Delight International Ltd, 2016 WL 5818597, *2 
(SDNY) (discussing that a magistrate judge in Monaco wrote that it was permissible for 
two corporations to seek discovery in the United States and submit it in their proceeding 
in Monaco); In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F Supp 2d at 299 (explaining that a presiding 
judge of a Frankfurt district court filed a letter stating that “[i]f . . . documents from a US–
American proceeding are attached to a written statement in the case file, the Court will 
take notice of this submission”). In In re Application of Schmitz, the Frankfurt judge later 
changed his mind after finding out that the German Ministry of Justice had opposed it. 
See Schmitz, 259 F Supp at 299. 
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facilitating dispute resolution across borders. Instead, case-by-
case participation is needed. 
They also suggest that processes for notifying and including 
foreign tribunals need to be systematized. A system of notification 
and consultation can be implemented immediately through shifts 
in judicial practice that federal appellate judges can enforce 
through abuse of discretion review. To ensure their consistent ap-
plication across the board, such notification and consultation 
practices need to be codified through the addition of a new Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure specifically governing transnational 
discovery requests. 
Moreover, a system of notification and consultation requires 
accompanying amendments to § 1782. The statute is currently in-
terpreted to permit discovery requests related to suits that are 
being contemplated and have yet to be filed.288 It should be 
amended to preclude prefiling discovery, because coordination is 
not possible when there is not yet a foreign tribunal presiding 
over the foreign dispute. There are two rationales for prefiling 
foreign discovery requests, neither of which is compelling. One is 
that prefiling discovery is necessary due to many foreign legal 
systems having higher pleading standards than the United 
States, and so prefiling discovery is needed to file the suit abroad 
in the first place. But a higher pleading standard does not justify 
uncoordinated prefiling discovery because the pleading standard 
may be a policy choice that reflects a desire to control discovery, 
as it does in the United States.289 The other rationale is that pre-
filing discovery is necessary to maximize the chances that US dis-
covery will be compelled in time for it to be used in the foreign 
tribunal. The challenge of timing US discovery to suit the needs 
of a foreign proceeding is a reason for better coordination, not for 
broadening the reach of US discovery in hopes that some of it is 
useful. Finally, extraterritorial discovery under § 1782 should be 
explicitly precluded because no coordination is needed in that sce-
nario. The foreign tribunal can order the discovery itself and a US 
court should refrain from doing so, ostensibly in the tribunal’s aid. 
 
 288 See Intel, 542 US at 259 (holding that § 1782 “requires only that a dispositive rul-
ing . . . be within reasonable contemplation”). 
 289 See Part III.A. 
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B. Seeking the Participation of Foreign Parties 
The Supreme Court additionally held in Intel that parity is a 
policy concern that district courts should address in their exercise 
of discretion. Yet, most § 1782 requests target nonparties to the 
foreign proceeding and are considered ex parte, without the par-
ticipation of the foreign opposing party. As noted in Part II, only 
37 percent of party requests in 2015 were contested either by the 
foreign opposing party or the nonparty target, and uncontested 
requests were more likely to be granted than contested requests. 
Whether the low contestation rate was due to lack of notice versus 
failure to contest could not be determined from docket analysis. 
Some courts no longer allow § 1782 requests to be considered 
ex parte, but notification requirements are currently erratic and 
need to be systematically applied.290 The foreign opposing party 
should always be notified and given an opportunity to intervene. 
The input of the foreign opposing party is needed to determine 
whether parity is lost by the grant of US discovery, to uphold uni-
versal notions of due process and fairness, and to ascertain infor-
mation regarding the foreign proceeding that is needed to apply 
the FRCP. This information includes whether the requested in-
formation is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, the im-
portance of the requested discovery to resolving the case, and the 
parties’ comparative resources and access to relevant infor-
mation. If granting the § 1782 request will unfairly benefit one 
party at the expense of another, then the foreign tribunal’s involve-
ment is also needed to enforce a reciprocal exchange of information. 
Like the requirement to notify and consult the foreign tribu-
nal, the requirement to notify and include the foreign opposing 
party can be achieved initially through changes in judicial prac-
tices. To ensure consistency across the many district courts that 
now receive § 1782 requests, this requirement should be codified 
in the new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing transna-
tional discovery requests. 
C. Improving Administrative Ease 
In Part II, I noted that docket analysis provides incomplete 
information about when multiple discovery requests are made in 
the United States for the same foreign proceeding because each 
foreign discovery request operates as its own stand-alone action. 
 
 290 See Part III.C.1. 
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A single foreign proceeding might generate many discovery re-
quests in different district courts and before different federal 
judges who are not aware of the other requests. This splintered 
structure makes foreign discovery requests uniquely difficult to 
administer, including making it difficult to assess whether dis-
covery requests are abusive, overly burdensome, or proportional 
to the demands of the case. 
Take, for example, the Chevron litigation and arbitration in 
Ecuador concerning oil contamination in the Amazon. Chevron 
filed over twenty-three § 1782 requests in district courts across 
the United States,291 resulting in at least fifty federal court orders 
and opinions.292 The indigenous plaintiffs and the government of 
Ecuador filed many more. In one instance, the Fifth Circuit over-
turned the district court’s denial of a discovery request made by 
the government of Ecuador on the basis that the foreign arbitra-
tion for which the discovery was sought was not a tribunal cov-
ered by § 1782.293 Although the ruling was consistent with Fifth 
Circuit precedent, the appellate court relied on judicial estoppel 
to overturn the denial. Chevron had previously successfully ar-
gued before district courts in other circuits that the foreign arbi-
tration was a tribunal covered by § 1782, and then taken ad-
vantage of a circuit split to argue the opposite in the Fifth Circuit. 
The Fifth Circuit became aware of these inconsistent positions 
because the Chevron foreign discovery requests were highly pub-
licized and most were opposed. But § 1782 requests typically are 
not high profile and internally inconsistent results could easily 
escape notice. 
I recommend that foreign discovery requests related to the 
same foreign proceeding be restructured to more closely resemble 
domestic discovery requests. The unit of analysis should not be a 
singular discovery request but rather a singular foreign proceed-
ing. Like domestic discovery requests that are initially all di-
rected to the same federal district court that oversees the plenary 
dispute, foreign discovery requests related to the same foreign 
plenary dispute should also, at least initially, all be directed to 
the same federal district court. If some discovery is needed from 
another district, the out-of-district request can be managed by a 
compliance court, as it is in the domestic context under 
 
 291 See Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 Va J Intl L 
127, 143 (2012). 
 292 See id. See also Chevron Corp v Naranjo, 667 F3d 232, 236 (2d Cir 2012). 
 293 See Republic of Ecuador v Connor, 708 F3d 651, 657–58 (5th Cir 2013). 
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FRCP 45.294 Having a central presiding judge is critical to seeing 
the overall effect of US discovery on the foreign proceeding, even 
if that judge is not presiding over the plenary dispute. Restruc-
turing foreign discovery requests in this way also reduces the bur-
den on foreign tribunals and foreign opposing parties who can 
participate in a centralized way rather than in separate actions 
across many district courts. 
Restructuring will require § 1782 to be amended. A more 
achievable but less effective short-term solution would be to re-
quire § 1782 applicants to report all other § 1782 discovery re-
quests linked to the same foreign proceeding so that they may be 
consolidated. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite their rapid growth in recent years, foreign discovery 
requests remain a small fraction of the overall federal docket.295 
Yet, they provide a lens for understanding the broader shift to-
ward disputes that straddle multiple legal systems and the chal-
lenges such disputes pose for courts and judges. At other proce-
dural junctures, too, private actors are planning strategically 
across borders while federal judges are operating at an informa-
tional disadvantage and engaging in the futile task of abstractly 
divining foreign interests. For instance, scholars have criticized 
federal courts for problematically dismissing transnational cases 
in the name of comity through doctrines such as forum non con-
veniens and comity abstention296 even when foreign courts and 
governments have not welcomed such dismissals.297 
As private actors become more savvy and transnational cases 
become more meaningfully connected to multiple fora, national 
judges can no longer operate in a silo. They need to seek out the 
participation of foreign parties because their decisions alter the 
procedural rights of private actors abroad. They need to seek out 
 
 294 See Part III.A. 
 295 Toward the end of the study period (2013–2017), there were approximately two 
hundred foreign discovery requests filed per year, see Appendix C, Table 5, whereas there 
were 292,076 civil filings overall in federal district courts in 2017. See US Courts, Federal 
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2017, archived at https://perma.cc/UUJ2-FY57. 
 296 See, for example, Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 Stan L Rev 
1081, 1089, 1115–16 (2015) (describing these doctrines as “avoidance doctrines” and criti-
cizing them for undermining US interests while driving plaintiffs to sue abroad). 
 297 See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 NYU L Rev 390, 394 
(2017) (explaining that certain cases dismissed for forum non conveniens were not viewed 
by the foreign tribunal as an act of comity but rather as an expression of protectionism). 
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the participation of foreign tribunals because they share overlap-
ping authority with foreign judges and arbitrators over certain 
cases. Ultimately, a reconceptualization of US judges as partners 
in global governance,298 engaged in the shared task of governing 
a common transnational litigation space, is needed. 
Global governance is defined as “the collective management 
of common problems at the international level.”299 Transnational 
litigation and discovery are now common international problems, 
governed by many national and international courts and tribu-
nals whose authorities are overlapping and nonhierarchical.300 
When a foreign dispute leads to a § 1782 request, the foreign court 
adjudicating the case and the US federal court receiving the dis-
covery request both have authority over the case, potentially lead-
ing to confusion and discord. Recognizing that federal judges are 
engaged in global governance reveals the forest from the trees: 
individually, these foreign discovery requests are routine and low 
profile; together, they give rise to a system of global governance 
marked by institutional conflict and chaos. 
This Article serves as a case study of a set of institutional 
challenges that will only grow in the coming years, and an exam-
ple of the type of institutional solutions that will be needed. It 
calls for scholarship on judicial information sharing and coordi-
nation across borders,301 as well as a deeper understanding of the 




 298 Thanks to Bill Dodge for suggesting this turn of phrase. 
 299 European Union Institute for Security Studies, Global Governance 2025: At a Crit-
ical Juncture *17 (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/K8NQ-WRKH. 
 300 Political scientists have observed that particular issue areas are now governed by 
“an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions,” which can in turn 
lead to confusion and conflict. Karen J. Alter and Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International 
Regime Complexity, 14 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 329, 333 (2018). See also generally Karen J. 
Alter and Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 Perspectives 
on Polit 13 (2009). 
 301 I explore this subject elsewhere. See generally Yanbai Andrea Wang, Procedural 
Coordination Across Borders (unpublished manuscript, 2020) (on file with author). 
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APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
I relied on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER) system to compile a dataset of incoming foreign discov-
ery requests for use in civil proceedings abroad.302 Other scholars 
have noted the sampling bias stemming from empirical efforts 
that rely on Westlaw or Lexis searches. Because Westlaw and 
Lexis contain more published than unpublished orders, have var-
ying completeness across district courts, and lack clarity on the 
exact contents of their databases, searches on these services are 
likely to yield biased results that do not reflect the overall reality 
on the ground.303 These problems are amplified by different pub-
lication practices across district courts,304 and are particularly 
worrisome for studying low-profile routine matters such as § 1782 
discovery orders, which tend to be unpublished. 
PACER is a mandatory electronic docketing system within 
federal district courts that provides access to all filed actions na-
tionwide. The process of moving to PACER’s electronic docketing 
system began in 1988, and was mostly completed by the mid-
2000s.305 Since PACER has limited search functions and does not 
allow text searching,306 I searched PACER’s contents on 
 
 302 PACER is a fee-based “electronic public access service that allows users to obtain 
case and docket information online from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts, 
and the PACER Case Locator.” See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Public Access to Court Electronic Records, archived at https://perma.cc/7GAV-95AX. 
 303 See, for example, Engstrom, 65 Stan L Rev at 1214–15  (cited in note 109) (dis-
cussing incompleteness in Westlaw’s and Lexis’s databases); Hoffman, Izenman, and  
Lidicker, 85 Wash U L Rev at 686 (cited in note 109) (same). When I inquired about the 
exact methodology by which Westlaw gathers its contents, a Westlaw reference attorney 
explained: “We . . . obtain reported decisions from the court, we have employees who are 
out acquiring non-published cases constantly and we receive request[s] to add cases from 
customer and sales reps.” Email from Stephanie Zoet, Academic Account Manager, Thom-
son Reuters (July 28, 2017) (on file with author). In phone conversations with Westlaw 
and Lexis representatives and reference attorneys, I was repeatedly told that the exact 
methodologies by which they compile their respective databases are proprietary infor-
mation that could not be shared. Both services declined to put me in touch directly with 
members of their data team. 
 304 Engstrom, 65 Stan L Rev at 1215 (cited in note 109). 
 305 PACER was initially accessible at terminals in libraries and other designated lo-
cations and became available on the Internet in 2001. See Bobbie Johnson, Recap: Crack-
ing Open US Courtrooms (The Guardian, Nov 11, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
PZ8V-MFGX (noting that PACER was initially accessible at terminals in libraries and 
other designated locations, and became available on the Internet in 2001); Engstrom, 65 
Stan L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 109). 
 306 The PACER Case Locator allows searches by case number, title, party name, and 
date range, but does not allow searches to identify cases for which this information is not 
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Bloomberg Law. Bloomberg Law’s database includes docket cov-
erage for all federal district courts since 1989.307 According to 
Bloomberg Law representatives, the service contains all of 
PACER’s content across that timespan, and continues to collect 
docket information and filed documents on a rolling basis. Bloom-
berg’s Advanced Dockets Search allows text searches of all docket 
reports as well as any underlying filed documents that have been 
rendered text searchable.308 
To compile as exhaustive as possible a dataset of incoming 
foreign civil discovery requests, I took four steps. First, I crafted 
and tested a variety of text search parameters for identifying for-
eign civil discovery requests. Since all foreign civil discovery re-
quests and some foreign criminal discovery requests are ulti-
mately executed under the authority of § 1782, the task was to 
create a dataset of discovery requests brought under § 1782 dur-
ing that time period, and then to exclude the criminal discovery 
requests. I tested different text searches on Bloomberg Law by 
cross-checking results for individual calendar years with cases 
identified by Westlaw as citing § 1782 for that same time period. 
When Westlaw only contained an appellate case, I looked for the 
corresponding district court case in the Bloomberg Law search re-
sults. I chose to use Westlaw over Lexis for this step because 
Westlaw is more inclusive.309 I adjusted the search terms until the 
only cases that were missing could not be captured without also 
pulling in domestic discovery disputes. In other words, I selected 
the text search that maximized sensitivity without significant 
sacrifices in specificity. The selected text search was: 
“letter rogatory” OR “letters rogatory” OR “judicial assis-
tance” OR “discovery in aid of international” OR “discovery 
in aid of foreign” OR (28 /5 1782) OR (use /s “foreign 
 
known. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, PACER Case Locator Ad-
vanced Case Search, online at https://pcl.uscourts.gov/pcl/pages/search/findCaseAdvanced.jsf 
(visited May 1, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 307 See Bloomberg Law, Bloomberg Law Docket Coverage, online at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/dockets/coverage/detail (visited May 17, 2020) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable) (noting that Bloomberg contains records of proceedings for all federal 
district courts from 1989 to the present). 
 308 Not all documents filed on PACER are text searchable (some are scanned as im-
ages), and the same goes for Bloomberg. There does not appear to be any pattern in which 
documents are text searchable. 
 309 See Hoffman, Izenman, and Lidicker, 85 Wash U L Rev at 710 n 138 (cited in note 
109) (noting that all opinions in Lexis were present in the Westlaw database, whereas 
some opinions were in Westlaw but not in Lexis). 
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proceeding”) OR (use /s “foreign proceedings”) OR (aid /s “for-
eign proceeding”) OR (aid /s “foreign proceedings”) 
Second, on May 31, 2018, I ran the above text search on 
Bloomberg Law on cases filed in all ninety-four federal district 
courts between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2017. As dis-
cussed in Part II, these dates were selected to capture how courts 
have treated foreign civil discovery requests during the years 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel. This initial search 
produced over ten thousand results. 
Third, since these results included many false positives that 
were not § 1782 requests, they were manually culled, a process 
that eliminated approximately two-thirds of the results, leaving 
over three thousand true positives. All available information was 
used to determine whether the case was a true § 1782 request, 
including if it was labelled as such in the title or in the “cause” 
field of the docket report. I did not include as true positives cases 
that were unambiguously erroneous uses of § 1782.310 Because the 
search terms I used included “letter rogatory” and “judicial assis-
tance,” many of the initial results were outgoing discovery re-
quests, seeking evidence from abroad for controversies being ad-
judicated in the United States. This manual culling was 
completed with the assistance of a team of research assistants. I 
spot-checked the results for accuracy. 
Fourth, to ensure that the dataset is close to exhaustive and 
unbiased, I cross-checked with cases identified by Westlaw as cit-
ing § 1782 for different calendar years than had been used to con-
struct the text search. The results confirmed my expectations: I 
missed less than 1 percent of cases identified by Westlaw, and I 
could not have captured them without expanding the search 
terms such that I would have lost a significant degree of specificity 
in the overall result. There does not appear to be a pattern in the 
types of § 1782 requests that are missing. They are missing be-
cause none of the search terms were mentioned in the docket re-
port or in the text searchable underlying documents. I could not 
detect any pattern in either the text labels entered into docket 
reports or whether underlying filed documents were text search-
able. I also confirmed that the dataset is close to complete and 
unbiased by internally checking those cases that were refiled 
 
 310 See, for example, Order, Whitehead Clan Foreign Trust v Conway, No 2:14-mc-
00072, *1 (D Ariz filed Nov 21, 2014) (denying the request because the court could not 
discern what the plaintiff was requesting). 
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under a different case number or consolidated.311 Anytime I came 
across one of these cases, I checked whether the refiled or consol-
idated case was also in the dataset. Finally, the dataset’s esti-
mated number of tribunal requests coming from OIJA is in line 
with the number of requests that OIJA itself estimates they are 
sending to district courts.312 
The dataset as a whole likely misses a few cases on the mar-
gins, but is close to exhaustive and unlikely to be biased. How-
ever, a cautionary note on the 2017 cases is in order: while Bloom-
berg Law representatives insist that the service regularly 
updates dockets and pulls in new documents as they are filed, 
that is not always accurate in my experience and in the experi-
ence of research assistants working on this project. Sometimes, it 
is necessary to manually click an “Update Docket” button to fetch 
the most recent documents. The result is that the text search was 
likely run on some docket reports for 2017 that were not fully up-
to-date and may undercount the number of § 1782 requests in 
that year. This problem did not seem to affect earlier years, likely 
because those dockets had, over time, become updated either due 
to Bloomberg Law clients manually updating those cases or by 
the system’s automatic update mechanism. Additionally, some of 
the 2017 cases may not yet have reached completion when the 
text search was run on May 31, 2018, again leading to the search 
being run on incomplete docket reports and possibly undercount-
ing cases in 2017. 
  
 
 311 See Part II.A; Part III.C.1 (discussing refiled cases). 
 312 Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53). 
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APPENDIX B: DATA CODING METHODOLOGY 
Of the over three thousand true positive § 1782 requests in 
the dataset, approximately one-third (over one thousand re-
quests) were randomly selected for further coding for the follow-
ing information. This coding was completed with the help of a 
team of research assistants. We met weekly to discuss difficult 
coding decisions and I spot-checked the results for accuracy. Some 
cases were sealed overall or had underlying documents that were 
sealed or otherwise unavailable. All available information was 
used to make determinations, or data was recorded as missing.313 
 
1. Civil or criminal: Some foreign criminal discovery requests 
were previously executed under § 1782. Criminal discovery re-
quests were coded as such and not examined further. 
2. District court: We coded for the district court to which civil 
discovery requests were made. 
3. Requestor: We coded for who brought the request, whether it 
was a tribunal, party, or interested person. If the request was 
brought by a tribunal, we tracked whether the request came 
directly to the district court, through the Department of Jus-
tice’s OIJA, or through a party. In some cases, requests were 
brought by multiple entities. 
4. Target: We coded for whether the request targeted a party, a 
nonparty, or both. 
5. Foreign tribunal type: We coded for the type of foreign tribunal 
before which the requested discovery was to be used—whether 
it was a foreign court, an international court, a regulatory 
agency, a commercial arbitral tribunal, or an investor-state 
arbitral tribunal. In some cases, requests indicated that the 
evidence would be used in multiple tribunals. 
6. Numerosity of foreign proceeding: We coded for whether the 
evidence was requested for one foreign proceeding or multiple 
foreign proceedings. 
7. Timing of foreign proceeding: We coded for the timing of the 
foreign proceeding for which the evidence was requested—
 
 313 Neither I nor OIJA is aware of any pattern in which cases become sealed or have 
missing documents. Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53). 
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whether the foreign proceeding was pending, contemplated, or 
mixed (if the evidence was requested for multiple proceedings). 
8. Country of foreign proceeding: We coded for the country or 
countries of the foreign proceeding(s) for which the evidence 
was requested. I then also categorized the country in four 
ways to look for patterns: by region, by Hague Evidence Con-
vention status, by legal system type, and by rule-of-law score. 
The categorizations are explained below. 
a. Regions—The countries appearing in the dataset were cate-
gorized by the following regions: 
i. Americas—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
ii. Caribbean—Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ja-
maica, British Virgin Islands, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
iii. Western Europe—Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, European Union, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom 
iv. Eastern Europe—Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Russia 
v. Middle East—Bahrain, Cyprus, Dubai, Egypt, Iran, Is-
rael, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates 
vi. Asia—American Samoa, Australia, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Pakistan, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan 
vii. Africa—Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, South Africa  
b. Hague Evidence Convention status—The countries ap-
pearing in the dataset were categorized by whether the 
Hague Evidence Convention was in force between that 
country and the United States in the calendar year when 
the case was filed. This may not be the same as whether 
the country is a member of the Hague Evidence 
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Convention. For example, although Brazil acceded to the 
Hague Evidence Convention, the United States has not ac-
cepted its accession, so the Convention is not in force be-
tween Brazil and the United States. Below is a list of coun-
tries for which the Hague Evidence Convention was in 
force with respect to the United States, including specific 
calendar years if that statement only holds true for a seg-
ment of the study period. If the Convention came into force 
between a country and the United States midway through 
a calendar year, I counted it as being in force starting in 
the following calendar year. Argentina, Australia, Barba-
dos, China, Colombia (since 2013), Croatia (2010), Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary (since 2007), India (since 
2007), Israel, Italy, South Korea (since 2010), Kuwait 
(since 2009), Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco (since 
2012), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia (since 2012), Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
Venezuela.  
c. Legal system type—The countries appearing in the dataset 
were categorized by legal system type as follows: 
i. Common law: Antigua, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Is-
lands, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jamaica, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom 
ii. Civil law: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Domin-
ican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Pan-
ama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
iii. Mixed/other: American Samoa, Bahrain, China, Cy-
prus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guernsey, India, Iran, 
Israel, Japan, Jersey, Kuwait, Liberia, Morocco, 
Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South Ko-
rea, United Arab Emirates 
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d. Rule-of-law score—The countries appearing in the dataset 
in 2015–2017 were categorized by rule-of-law score quar-
tile. To derive the quartiles, I used the World Justice Pro-
ject’s Rule of Law Index,314 and only looked at scores from 
2015 to 2017 because the scoring instrument varied with 
each report during earlier years, whereas the scores are 
more comparable during this three-year period.315 The in-
dex evaluates eight factors: constraints on government 
powers, absence of corruption, open government, funda-
mental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, 
civil justice, and criminal justice. Although each country is 
given a score as well as sub-scores for each factor, I only 
relied on the overall composite score. The following is a list 
of the countries in each quartile, with years if the country 
was not in that quartile for the full three-year period. In 
any given year, countries in the fourth quartile have the 
highest rule-of-law scores, while those in the first quartile 
have the lowest scores. Some countries in the dataset were 
not scored by the World Justice Project, and so appear in 
the “no score” category. 
i. 4th Quartile: Australia, Austria, Barbados (2016), Bel-
gium, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland 
(2016, 2017), Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, 
Singapore, Slovenia (2016, 2017), Spain, St. Kitts and 
 
 314 Like other rule-of-law indexes, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index, and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has been criticized for 
conceptual and methodological problems. Without discounting or overlooking those prob-
lems, I use the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index as an imperfect way to generate 
a rough picture of the types of legal systems with which federal district courts are inter-
acting in foreign discovery requests, and whether that picture is different for foreign tri-
bunal versus foreign party requests. See note 135. 
 315 Current & Historical Data (World Justice Project), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
S99Y-KY44: 
[T]he construction of the indicators and the underlying survey instruments were 
slightly revised with the publication of each report during those years. For these 
reasons, we ask all users to use caution in comparing scores over time, though 
it can be noted that indicator construction and WJP’s survey instruments have 
remained relatively stable since 2015, so comparisons can be made with more 
confidence from 2015–2020. 
A spreadsheet of the current and historical data can be downloaded at the site. 
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Nevis (2017), Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay 
ii. 3rd Quartile: Antigua (2016, 2017), Argentina (2016, 
2017), Bahamas (2016, 2017), Barbados (2017), Bela-
rus (2015), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominica (2016, 2017), Georgia, 
Ghana, Greece, Grenada (2016, 2017), Hungary, Italy, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Macedonia (2015, 2016), Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Nepal (2015), Panama (2015), Philippines 
(2015), Romania, Senegal, Slovenia (2015), South Af-
rica, St. Kitts and Nevis (2016), St. Lucia (2016, 2017), 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2016, 2017), Trinidad 
and Tobago (2016, 2017), Tunisia (2015, 2017), United 
Arab Emirates 
iii. 2nd Quartile: Albania, Argentina (2015), Belarus 
(2016, 2017), Belize, Burkina Faso (2016, 2017), China, 
Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire (2015, 2017), Dominican Re-
public (2015), El Salvador, Guyana (2016, 2017), India, 
Indonesia, Iran (2017), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Leb-
anon (2015), Macedonia (2017), Malawi, Moldova, Mo-
rocco, Nepal (2016, 2017), Panama (2016, 2017), Peru, 
Russia (2015), Philippines (2016), Serbia, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname (2016, 2017), Tanzania (2015, 2016), Thai-
land, Tunisia (2016), Ukraine, Vietnam, Zambia 
iv. 1st Quartile: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso (2015), Cambodia, Cameroon, Cote 
D’Ivoire (2016), Dominican Republic (2016, 2017), Ec-
uador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran 
(2015, 2016), Kenya, Lebanon (2016, 2017), Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mexico, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines (2017), Russia (2016, 2017), Si-
erra Leone, Tanzania (2017), Turkey, Uganda, Uzbek-
istan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
v. No score: Andorra, American Samoa, British Virgin Is-
lands, Cyprus, European Union, Isle of Man, Israel, 
Jersey, Kuwait, Monaco, Switzerland, Taiwan 
9. Substance area of foreign proceeding: We coded for the sub-
stantive area in dispute in the foreign proceeding—whether it 
was antitrust, bankruptcy, contract (generic contract that 
does not fit into another category), corporate (disputes 
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regarding corporate structure or breach of an officer’s fiduci-
ary duty), environmental, employment, family (disputes re-
garding divorce, child custody, or inheritance), fraud (generic 
fraud that does not fit into another category), maritime, intel-
lectual property or trade secret, products liability, securities, 
tax, tort (generic tort that does not fit into another category), 
and other (any requests not covered by the above). 
10. Number of docket lines: We coded for the number of docket 
lines it took to resolve a request. This is a very rough gauge of 
case complexity. Where a request was still pending, we did not 
track this data. 
11. Number of orders: We coded for the number of orders it took 
to resolve a request. This is another very rough gauge of case 
complexity. Where a request was still pending, we did not 
track this data. 
12. Outcome: We coded for the outcome of the request—whether 
it was granted to some extent (including those that were 
granted in part or subsequently quashed in part), denied alto-
gether, or reached no resolution. Where an initial result was 
later altered, we looked at the final outcome. A request 
reached no resolution if it was withdrawn or otherwise termi-
nated before a decision was made. Where a request was still 
pending, we did not track the outcome. 
13. Contestation: For 2015 cases only, we coded for whether the re-
quest was challenged. A request may be challenged by the tar-
get of discovery, whether party or nonparty to the foreign pro-
ceeding, or it may be challenged by the nontarget opposing 
party. It may be challenged at the outset, or after a request is 
initially granted ex parte. A challenge may take the form of a 
motion to quash, motion to vacate, motion to stay, motion for 
reconsideration, or a motion to compel from the requestor that 
is opposed. I did not count entries of stipulated protective orders 
or other requests for confidentiality agreements as contestation. 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 5: FOREIGN DISCOVERY REQUESTS EXECUTED UNDER 
§ 1782, DATA SUMMARY, 2005–2017316 
 
Year Total number of cases Cases sampled317 
2005 290 102 
2006 210 62 
2007 275 97 
2008 267 91 
2009 218 70 
2010 197 59 
2011 212 72 
2012 177 73 
2013 233 82 
2014 293 94 
2015 237 98 
2016 312 111 
2017 239 81 
Total 3160 1092 
  
 
 316 The year of a case is determined by the day on which it was filed. 
 317 I drew a random sample across the entire study period for detailed coding. 
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TABLE 6: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FOREIGN DISCOVERY 









































































































































































































 318 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population 
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable 
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 319 There is a very small number of requests associated with both underlying civil 
claims and related criminal proceedings or investigations. These mixed requests comprise 
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TABLE 7: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY MOST 






































































2 percent of the sample and were distributed across years. Because this Article focuses on 
civil requests, I include these mixed cases in the civil requests group. 
 320 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population 
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable 
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 321 Where a request came from both a tribunal and another entity, I counted it as a 
tribunal request. Where the request came from both a party and an interested person, I 
counted it as a party request. I applied these rules because the Supreme Court instructed 
judges to gauge foreign tribunal receptivity, which judges can do as long as the foreign 
tribunal is one of the requestors. See Intel, 542 US at 264–65. 
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TABLE 9: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY TARGET322 
 
Target 





































TABLE 10: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY TYPE OF 



































































 322 To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric 
distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) 
tribunal requests in the overall population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a 
second time to estimate how many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals. 
I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal re-
quests to calculate the lower bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This 
method errs on the side of wider-than-necessary confidence intervals. 
 323 Where a request came from more than one tribunal type, it was counted toward 
both categories, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. I double 
counted because each tribunal type is independently significant. 
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TABLE 11: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY NATURE 





























































TABLE 12: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY MOST 
COMMON AREA OF FOREIGN DISPUTE324, 325 
 











































 324 To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric 
distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) 
tribunal requests in the overall population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a 
second time to estimate how many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals. 
I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal re-
quests to calculate the lower bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This 
method errs on the side of wider-than-necessary confidence intervals. 
 325 Where the dispute in the foreign proceeding touched on multiple substance areas, 
I counted them toward all applicable categories. 
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TABLE 13: ESTIMATED COMPLEXITY OF CIVIL REQUESTS326 
 
Year 











































































































































 326 I calculated these 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent quantiles for the median using 
bootstrap resampling (ten thousand bootstrap samples per interval). 
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TABLE 14: OUTCOME FOR SAMPLED CIVIL REQUESTS327 
 
Year 













2005 9 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
2006 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 0 (0%) 
2007 18 (95%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 6 (86%) 0 (0%) 1 (14%) 
2008 11 (92%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 10 (56%) 3 (17%) 5 (28%) 
2009 19 (86%) 1 (5%) 2 (9%) 13 (93%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 
2010 11 (92%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 16 (64%) 4 (16%) 4 (20%) 
2011 14 (82%) 1 (6%) 2 (12%) 26 (72%) 5 (14%) 5 (14%) 
2012 20 (91%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 25 (74%) 3 (9%) 6 (18%) 
2013 25 (96%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 30 (73%) 4 (10%) 7 (17%) 
2014 33 (97%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 28 (72%) 6 (15%) 5 (13%) 
2015 35 (90%) 0 (0%) 4 (10%) 37 (80%) 2 (4%) 7 (15%) 
2016 38 (93%) 1 (2%) 2 (5%) 26 (67%) 9 (23%) 4 (10%) 
2017 25 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 34 (83%) 2 (5%) 5 (12%) 
Overall 262 (93%) 5 (2%) 16 (6%) 264 (75%) 41 (12%) 49 (14%) 
 
 
 327 This table represents the outcome of foreign civil discovery requests in the ran-
domly drawn sample. 
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TABLE 15: ESTIMATED GRANT RATES FOR CIVIL REQUESTS328 
 
Year Grant Rate 95% CI 
2005 92.9% 69.6%—97.8% 
2006 81.3% 57.1%—95.2% 
2007 100% 87.5%—100% 
2008 87% 68.7%—96.4% 
2009 93.9% 81.9%—98.3% 
2010 87.5% 73.5%—95.7% 
2011 87% 75.7%—93.9% 
2012 91.8% 82.9%—96.9% 
2013 93.5% 86.2%—97.8% 
2014 91.2% 83.2%—96% 
2015 97.3% 92.1%—99% 
2016 86.5% 78.4%—92.3% 
2017 96.8% 90.1%—99% 
Tribunal Requests 2005–2017 98.1% 96.1%—99.3% 
Party Requests 2005–2017 86.6% 82.9%—89.6% 




 328 This table shows grant rates in the sampled foreign civil discovery requests, cal-
culated as the number of granted requests divided by the number of granted requests plus 
the number of denied requests. To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals for tribu-
nal and party requests, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 per-
cent confidence interval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall 
population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a second time to estimate how 
many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals. I took a conservative ap-
proach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower 
bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This method errs on the side of 
wider-than-necessary confidence intervals. 
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FIGURE 4: SHANNON’S ENTROPY, CALCULATED ON MIXTURE OF 




 329 Shannon’s Entropy has been used in varied contexts to measure the diversity of 
populations. It captures both “richness” (the number of different categories within a pop-
ulation) and “evenness” (the equiprobability of randomly drawing any particular cate-
gory). The more categories (here, countries) there are in a population, and the more evenly 
the population is divided across those categories, the higher Shannon’s Entropy. 
